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this article considers the rise and decline of student movements in Europe and america 
during the 1960s and 1970s. Drawing on materials on student movements in a number 
of countries, it assesses their historical significance, in the context of a larger ‘protest 
wave’ with which the student movements of the period intersected. Relating these 
movements to students’ changing position within advanced capitalism, it suggests that 
their dynamics were shaped both by the specific characteristics of students as political 
actors and by the patterns of their inter‑relations with other contemporaneous move‑
ments. the article concludes by noting more recent developments, suggesting that the 
story of student movements still offers interesting new possibilities. 
The 1960s and early 1970s were notable for the rise and spread of student 
movements across many parts of the industrialized world. There were two 
interconnected facets to student movements in this period. The first was 
the spread of movements on university and college campuses, protesting at 
specific regulations, policies and actions by the academic authorities. In 
some cases, although on a smaller scale, these movements also involved high 
school students. The second was the involvement of growing numbers of 
students in other significant movements of the period, notably on the Left. 
The two processes, in turn, influenced each other.
Situating	student	movements
Here I want to pose several questions about these developments. First, why 
did these movements appear when they did? Second, why did they take the 
forms they did? Third, how did they relate to other movements of the 
period? Fourth, what were their limits of development? And, fifth, what 
forces led to their decline and retreat?
Answers to questions posed in this form imply a historical analysis. In 
other words, they imply rejection of some of the explanations offered at the 
time for ‘student revolt’. Neil Smelser and others, for example, interpreted 
student insurgency as a form of intergenerational battle, an Oedipal revolt 
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of the sons against their fathers (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, 2001). This 
a-historical theory did not explain why it was only from 1964 onwards that 
students mobilized on college campuses, given that Oedipal urges are 
 presumably rather more universal. Moreover, surveys of students who 
 participated in these revolts suggested that their parents were more likely 
themselves to have liberal or radical backgrounds, and indeed to be rela-
tively supportive of their offspring’s political delinquency (Lipset and 
Altbach, 1967). Was student revolt perhaps the product of frustrations 
 experienced by upwardly mobile working-class students (an explanation 
mentioned in Harman et al., 1968)? That didn’t account for the upper-and 
middle-class origin of many of the student protestors.1 Nor, on the other 
hand, was the hostile idea, propounded by the French Communist Party 
or the Polish regime, that students were ‘traditional middle class’ any better, 
for that took no account either of the expanding numbers of students from 
working-class families or of the changing situation facing students in the 
labour market (Jones, 1969). Or perhaps it was the poor physical condi-
tions experienced by many students in the rapidly expanding universities 
that drove them to revolt? There is no question that, often, facilities for the 
massively expanded numbers of students were indeed poor.2 The problem 
with that explanation is that, by and large, material conditions were not the 
issues that exercised student protestors in this period; rather, they raised 
questions about their own and others’ civil and political rights and about 
such larger questions as America’s war in Vietnam, and the authoritarian 
character of social institutions generally. Ginsborg writes of the Italian 
 student revolt that ‘[t]he year 1968 [...] was much more than a protest 
1 Bereday managed to combine the two in a splendidly biased account: ‘All universities train the 
elites. In all appear sons of the elite firmly and securely bound to follow their fathers. In all appear 
also some sons of the “have nots” aware that their talent will carry them into the ranks of the elite. 
Such students rarely riot. The activists are rather a coalition of the splinters of these groups: sons 
of the elite who for some reason or for the time being don’t want to join in, who instead want “to 
get even with their fathers”; and sons of the “have-nots” whose prospects of absorption into the 
elite are not secure or not attractive and who instead of “joining” elect to “lick” it. The coalition 
of these two groups is usually unbeatable. The rebel sons of the elite supply the know-how of how 
to operate and to rock the establishment. The rebel “have-nots” supply the fury and the determi-
nation to forge head which only those who have been “left out” can muster.’ (Bereday, 1967: 120).
2 At the beginning of 1968 there were 156,000 university students in Paris, but only 500 seats in the 
university library. ‘Practical work in science laboratories is often done in batches of 40 or more, and 
it is not unknown for a small lecture room to be crammed with 500 students trying to take notes from 
one lecturer’ (Cliff and Birchall, 1968: 214). By 1968, the three Italian universities of Rome, Naples 
and Bari, each designed for student populations of 5,000, contained 140,000 students between them. 
Italy’s university lecturers were ‘notorious absentees’; there were no seminars or tutorials and thus 
almost no staff-student contact. Most examinations were oral – Turin students described them as 
‘occasions when a policeman dressed up as a teacher spends five to ten minutes liquidating the accused 
with a series of questions.’ Only half the students succeeded in graduating (Ginsborg, 1990: 299-300).
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against poor conditions. It was an ethical revolt, a notable attempt to turn 
the tide against the predominant values of the time’ (Ginsborg, 1990).
An adequate account of student movements in the 1960s and early 1970s 
ought, in short, to take seriously what students themselves said and did. By 
comparison with later periods, for example, we can note that generally stu-
dent movements did not raise demands about student finance: tuition fees, 
grants and the like. Nor did they protest – as French students did in 2006 – 
at proposed legislation concerning their future employment prospects. Also, 
our account ought to attempt an explanation of why student movements 
appeared at the time they did, rather than at some other time. It was not 
the case that students suddenly discovered grievances about university 
administrations. When, at the beginning of the 1960s, for example, a man 
and a woman student at Oxford University were disciplined for being found 
in bed with each other, he was suspended for a short period while she was 
expelled permanently. There was a widespread sentiment among Oxford 
students that this application of a ‘double standard’ was grossly unjust, but 
no one suggested any collective action against the university authorities (not 
even a petition). Had the same thing happened six or seven years later, it 
would have been a likely casus belli. By then, also not only would the ‘dou-
ble standard’ have been a contentious issue, but so would the authorities’ 
claim to interfere in students’ sexual lives. By then, too, the idea of protest 
at the university would have become familiar.
Taking seriously what students did and said suggests a rejection of expla-
nations of student revolt, which rely either on the psycho-pathology of indi-
vidual students or on some unmediated response to unsatisfactory material 
conditions. That argument, of course, owes much to the very developments 
in thinking about social movements that followed after the movements of 
the 1960s. Indeed, those developments were one of the student movements’ 
intellectual results. The shift in styles of thinking is most notable within 
North American academic social science. Before and indeed during the ini-
tial wave of student campus protest, the predominant academic discourse 
about popular protest was that of ‘collective behaviour’. Here the ruling 
presumption was that protest is an expression of anomie, irrationality and 
psychological disturbance. In the wake of the same movements, there was 
a major paradigm-shift within the academy, measurable in terms of a con-
tent-analysis of leading sociological journals (Morris and Herring, 1987). 
James B. Rule has suggested that the shift amounted to the closest thing in 
social science to an actual revolution (Rule, 1989). A cohort of graduate 
students and junior professors, who had themselves participated in or at 
least actively sympathized with the movements of the 1960s read the existing 
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literature, found themselves, their activities and their sympathies written 
off as pathological, and set about remaking the discipline.3 If nothing else, 
student revolt altered the way we can now talk about it.
But if we are to explore, rather than reject, the specific rationality of 
 student movements of the 1960s and early 1970s, we cannot do so without 
regard to other social, political, and cultural movements of the time. Student 
movements do not develop in isolation from wider social conflicts. To be 
sure, they may possess their own specific dynamics, as a product of their 
particular social composition and the situations of their emergence. But 
they are anything but immune to larger tendencies of development, to which 
they make their own contribution.
A	protest	wave
Considered in this light, the period under discussion was marked by a much 
larger, and diverse movement of protest, affecting a whole range of countries 
across the globe. Indeed, it makes sense to talk of an international ‘protest 
wave’ from, broadly, the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, which encompassed 
much more than simply student movements. 
The onset of such a protest wave is marked by a rise in the overall level 
of ‘episodes of contention’ – that is, of such phenomena as demonstrations, 
strikes, riots, occupations and the like – across the whole face of society. 
Moreover, it is not simply that there are more such episodes, but they involve 
more people.
Another term for this phenomenon, within the social movement lite-
rature, is a ‘cycle of protest’ (Tarrow, 1983, 1989a, 1989b, 1993, 1994). 
I prefer the term ‘wave’ to ‘cycle’, because of the potential risk that the 
 phenomenon can be taken to mean something akin to the ‘semi-automatic’ 
cyclical processes familiar in economic studies. Protest waves seem to follow 
nothing like the regular ups and downs of economic cycles (Frank and 
Fuentes, 1984). Nor – more to the point – are their trajectories best under-
stood as following the kinds of inevitable sequences once hypothesized 
by the ‘natural history of revolution’ (Brinton, 1965), or by the kind of 
‘metaphysical pathos’ that Alvin Gouldner identified in Michels’ account 
of the ever-repeating waves of popular insurgency (Gouldner, 1955).4 They 
3 There are notably clear critiques of the ‘collective behaviour’ tradition and arguments for alter-
natives in Aya, 1979; McAdam, 1988; McPhail, 1991. 
4 On Michels, see also Barker, 2001. Tarrow and his colleagues engage in something of an auto-
critique in their recent re-formulation of social movement theory: ‘By positing a recurring parabolic 
shape to episodes of contention, cyclical theory begged the question of the internal composition 
of the cycle and whether there are episodes that take different forms altogether’ (McAdam, Tarrow 
and Tilly, 2002: 66).
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are open-ended processes, containing varieties of possibility in terms of 
tempo, extent, degree of mobilization, inner configuration, outcome, and 
so on. 
A protest wave is a phenomenon in its own right, and more than simply 
the sum of its parts (Tarrow, 1983). Two features are particularly notable in 
the present context. First, a protest wave is a period marked by high levels 
of innovation in, and rapid diffusion of what Charles Tilly has taught us to 
term ‘repertoires of contention’ (Tilly, 1978, 1993, 1995). One process asso-
ciated with the development of new tactics of struggle and of organizing is 
the entry into the field of protest of new social forces and new issues. Here, 
the growth of student protest played a significant part. Second, there is an 
intimate and dynamic relation between the different movements that com-
prise the overall development of the protest wave. So, for example, in the 
United States (which played an exceptional part in initiating the overall pro-
test wave), there was an ongoing interaction between the civil rights move-
ment and student protest on the campuses, between both of these and the 
developing movement against the American war in Vietnam, and in turn 
between all of these and both workers’ movements on the shop floor and 
the emerging women’s movement. The various ‘parts’ both stimulate and 
constrain each other in their onward development.5
The protest wave of the 1960s and 1970s was, notably, an international 
phenomenon. It had a novel feature, compared with earlier such waves, 
like those around the 1848 revolutions in Europe or the explosions of 
 popular protest that marked and followed the end of the First World War. 
The novel element was the role of student struggles. In earlier periods, stu-
dents were more commonly found on the side of reaction. June 1848 in 
Paris saw students on the ‘bourgeois’ side of the barricades;6 likewise 
in the revolutions of 1917-19 in Europe. During the British general strike 
of 1926, university students were remembered chiefly as strike-breakers. 
Students were not notable contributors to anti-fascism in interwar Europe. 
By the 1960s, however, matters were different. Although there were some 
right-wing student mobilizations, they were not the predominant pattern. 
Rather, a widespread link was assumed between student activism and 
 radicalism and even revolutionism. 
5 The ‘reciprocal action’ between different parts of a movement was a feature of earlier movements. 
Perhaps the first writer to draw attention to this was the Polish-German revolutionary, Rosa 
 Luxemburg, writing about mass strikes in Russia (Luxemburg, 1986).
6 When students did participate in the struggle against absolutism during the 1848 revolutions, 
Marx and Engels were rather scornful about their reliability: see the discussion in Draper, 
1978: 534-8.
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However, even though that element was new, it was only part of a larger 
overall picture. Thus, for example, international indices of workers’ involve-
ment in strikes also rose during the period 1965-75, although to varying 
degrees in different countries.7
The	global	context
What kind of world engendered the international protest wave? It was, in 
a number of significant respects, rather different from today. Firstly, the 
postwar world economy experienced the longest and most continuous boom 
in the history of industrial capitalism. The boom induced extensive changes 
in the social structure. There was a very marked expansion in the numbers 
of ‘white-collar’ workers, while huge numbers of workers were drawn off 
the land and into the cities. Factory and office work both expanded as the 
agricultural work-force declined. One political effect was to undermine the 
social bases of ‘old conservatism’, rooted in large peasantries. Another effect 
was that almost continuous full employment within industrial nations engen-
dered, on the one hand, working-class confidence and readiness to take 
strike action along with, on the other hand, a relatively low tendency to 
political generalization.
Sustained economic growth was widely attributed to wise management 
by governments, who played an unprecedently large role in directing their 
domestic economies. Not only did welfare spending rise, but governments 
were directly involved in various forms of investment direction, both within 
extensive nationalized industrial sectors and also in collaboration with 
 leading private corporations. Such state involvement was, indeed, assumed 
to be an essential feature of economic growth, not only in the ‘communist’ 
economies but also in the West, where Keynesian thinking provided the 
predominant doctrine of political economy.
Within the social sciences, dominant discourses stressed social stability. 
If a rather self-satisfied Keynesianism ruled in economics, Talcott Parsons’s 
structural functionalism provided the major paradigm within sociology. 
‘The withering away of the strike’, ‘the end of ideology’, the self-superces-
sion of capitalism by a new managerialism, the decline of class: such themes 
were confidently and regularly rehearsed. Even the confrontation between 
Western ‘capitalism’ and Russian ‘communism’ was expected to soften 
through ‘convergence’, with the West moving towards greater state planning 
and the East, after Stalin, moving towards greater liberalization. Even on 
the Left, most writers who were critical of the system also emphasized the 
7 See, for example, Crouch and Pizzorno, 1978.
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underlying stabilization of social relations. They too stressed the ins-
titutionalization of collective bargaining, and the de-radicalization (even 
‘embourgeoisement’) of the working class under the dual impact of 
 rising living standards and modern mass media. Herbert Marcuse’s 
One-Dimensional Man, though deeply antagonistic to the societies of 
both East and West, saw human liberation now under the lock and key 
of modern technology:
Technical progress, extended to a whole system of domination and coordination, 
creates forms of life (and power) which appear to reconcile forces opposing the 
system. An overriding interest in the preservation and improvement of the institu-
tional status quo united the former antagonists (bourgeoisie and proletariat) in the 
most advanced areas of contemporary society. [...] The ‘people’, previously the 
 ferment of social change, have ‘moved up’ to become the ferment of social cohesion. 
(Marcuse, 1964)
The only hope for change lay with ‘the substratum of the outcasts, the 
exploited, the persecuted of other races and other colours, the unemployed 
and the unemployable’ (Marcuse, 1964: 256). In like manner, C. Wright 
Mills, and later Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, denied that the working class 
in advanced capitalism any longer offered any radical threat (Baran and 
Sweezy, 1966; Mills, 1960). For them, the best hope for change lay with 
either liberal intellectuals or the anti-colonial revolutions in the Third World. 
The French theorist of the ‘new working class’, Andre Gorz, went so far as 
to declare, in early 1968, ‘in the foreseeable future there will be no crisis of 
European capitalism so dramatic as to drive the mass of workers to revolu-
tionary general strikes’ (Gorz, 1968).8 In this period, the official Left parties 
were pulling to the Right: the parties of the Second International were aban-
doning the old talk of ‘socialism’ while western Communist Parties were 
adopting ‘parliamentary roads’. As for the revolutionary Left, it was tiny 
and utterly marginal.
There were, nonetheless, within this seemingly endless expansion and 
containment, significant contradictions at work. Growth within the ‘com-
munist’ bloc was gradually slowing, with Czechoslovakia actually experi-
encing a short recession in 1963; nationalist tensions were growing, most 
markedly in the emerging Sino-Soviet split. In the West, beneath the 
umbrella of US economic and military hegemony, West Germany, France, 
8 Gorz had the misfortune to see his article appear in English in May 1968, just as Europe’s largest 
ever general strike was breaking out!
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Italy and Japan all experienced ‘economic miracles’ that sharpened com-
petition for markets and slowly undermined the position of the dollar. 
Within western nation-states, growing concern about maintaining economic 
competitiveness spurred state planning forward. It was just that concern 
which fuelled the huge expansion of investment in universities from the 
early 1960s.
Secondly, national liberation struggles were still being fought fiercely in 
the still considerable remnants of the old colonial empires. One of these, 
the Vietnamese struggle to reunify their country, fuelled the most impor-
tant international conflict of the later 1960s and early 1970s, the bitter and 
costly American war in Vietnam (and later Cambodia).
Thirdly, if mainstream sociology spoke of the inevitable link between 
industrial progress and liberal democracy, the analysis only fitted ‘the north’ 
of western capitalism. Sectors of the western industrialized world were still 
dominated by undemocratic, authoritarian regimes. In Europe, Spain and 
Portugal remained under the heel of pre-war fascist regimes, while in Greece 
a military coup in 1967 put paid to democracy. In Northern Ireland the 
Orange state systematically discriminated against Roman Catholics. Perhaps, 
though, most significant was the situation in the southern states of the USA, 
where the old racist system of Jim Crow segregation still excluded most 
Blacks from voting and from anything approaching equal civil rights. Jim 
Crow began only a few miles south of Washington, capital of the most 
 powerful nation-state in the world. It was here, above all, ‘in the belly of 
the beast’, that the first major impulses of the protest wave were registered. 
They would soon draw students in.
University	expansion
This post-1945 world produced a huge expansion in post-secondary education. 
Increasingly, industrial capitalism required, not just a qualified elite, but a 
growing mass of individuals who could be trained to become ‘white-collar’ 
workers, performers of ‘mental labour’: scientists, technologists, administra-
tors and managers, lawyers, teachers, social workers, and so on. This was the 
fastest expanding sector of the workforce, whose pay and working conditions 
were slowly converging towards those of ‘skilled manual’ workers.
The USA had been the pioneer of ‘mass’ higher education: by the late 
1960s, 30 per cent of the age-group was in college (Jones, 1969: 32). Some 
American educational administrators were remarkably blunt about what 
they saw as the functions of the modern university: John Hannah, President 
of Michigan State, declared in September 1961, ‘[o]ur colleges and univer-
sities must be regarded as bastions of our defence, as essential to preserva-
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tion of our country and our way of life as super-sonic bombers, nuclear 
powered submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles’. Clark Kerr, 
soon to become famous through his role in confronting campus protest at 
Berkeley, argued, ‘the university has become a prime instrument of national 
purpose. This is new. This is the essence of the transformation now engulf-
ing our universities’ (Davidson, 1969). Kerr coined the term ‘multiversity’ 
to define the new giant institutions, which should, he said, be thought of 
as ‘knowledge factories’.9
In this field, where America led, the other major industrial powers fol-
lowed rapidly. The West German ‘economic miracle’ demanded a changed 
labour force. Employer organizations voiced their concerns about expected 
shortages of skilled and white-collar workers and their general need for a 
more knowledgeable workforce. The Bonn government moved to overcome 
the projected labour shortfall by dramatically expanding post-secondary edu-
cation, increasing subsidies for students, and opening universities to appli-
cants from broader social backgrounds. The number of universities increased 
from 112 in 1950 to 735 in 1980, the numbers of students in post-secondary 
schools grew by 500 per cent between 1950 and 1975. By close of 1970s, West 
Germany possessed an unusually well educated workforce, with almost half 
its wage earners in ‘white collar’ jobs (Zirakzadeh, 2006). In the process, the 
social composition of the working class was dramatically altering.
In Italy, the number of university students grew from 268,000 in 1960 to 
over 450,000 in 1968 (Ginsborg, 1990: 299). In Britain, where state spending 
on universities in the 1920s amounted to no more than £1 million a year, 
rising to £4 millions in the 1940s, the figure by the mid-1960s was £200 mil-
lions. As the official Robbins Report of October 1963, which proposed this 
enormous expansion, explained, ‘Unless higher education is rapidly 
reformed, [...] there is little hope of this densely populated island maintaining 
an adequate position in the fiercely competitive world of the future’ (Robbins, 
1963: para 16). Lord Robbins warned Britain’s rulers, ‘we are in real danger 
of being outclassed and undersold’ (Harman et al., 1968). Robbins had esti-
mated that there would need to be 197,000 students in universities and 
75,000 in training colleges, but by October 1967 both these targets had 
already been exceeded. Despite the expansion, demand for college places 
exceeded the supply, as it became harder to gain admission. Where, in 1900, 
students constituted only 1 per cent of the relevant age group, by 1972 the 
figure was 15 percent (Harman, 1988). 
9 An early, and influential document of the American student movement was written by a Berkeley 
University librarian, the Marxist scholar Hal Draper, under the title ‘The mind of Clark Kerr’ 
(extracts in Draper, 1965: 199-214).
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In France, Japan, the Scandinavian countries and elsewhere – though 
least where dictatorial governments feared the social consequences of uni-
versity growth – the story was similar. In Mexico, student numbers expanded 
fast from 1960 in 73,600 to 838,000 by 1980 (Zirakzadeh, 2006).
If states had come to realise the need for large-scale expansion of univer-
sity and other post-school education, they were less clear about what form 
these expanded institutions should take. Britain’s Robbins Report 
 recommended that big expansion should go along with maintaining the 
 traditional relaxed and liberal ethos of university life. That did not fit well 
with the perceived need for universities to produce more ‘trained personnel’ 
for industry and commerce. The incoming Labour Government, from 1964, 
began to promote a new, cut-price version of Higher Education, in the shape 
of Civic Universities and Polytechnics. These, it was hoped and intended, 
would be more directly responsive to the needs of local business, and it was 
not unusual for their new Governing Boards to be appointed on this basis.10
In West Germany, the universities were re-opened after the defeat of 
Nazism on an essentially idealistic basis as ‘a community of instructors and 
instructed’, a place founded with the progressive, if not Utopian aim of 
serving ‘the development of the intellect, free from material, political and 
ideological forces’. This created an emergent contradiction with the need 
to develop institutions to service capital’s demand for scientific and aca-
demically-based technical progress (Budderberg, 1968). That contradic-
tion, Budderberg suggests, evinced itself in contradictory proposals for uni-
versity development. On one side, business thinkers wanted universities to 
become ‘academic Taylorist’ institutions, with shortened periods of study 
for individual students and stricter regimentation and standardization of 
courses. Such proposals to increase turnover and output hardly matched 
the ethos of the traditional university.11 At the other pole, Left students 
10 See, for example, Marvin Garsons’ analysis of the Board of Regents of the University of Califor-
nia (Garson, 1965), or the account of the Governors of the new Warwick University (Thompson, 
1968). Davidson cites a study of leading American universities: ‘Altogether the evidence of major 
university-business connections at high levels seems overwhelming. The numerous high positions 
of power in industry, commerce and finance held by at least two-thirds of the governing bodies of 
these 30 leading universities would appear to give a decisive majority more than ample grounds 
for identifying their personal interests with those of business.’ (Davidson, 1969: 337).
11 A personal memory: when I began my first academic post, in what would become Manchester 
Polytechnic, the Vice-Principal told new staff we should not think so much about our students as 
people to have their minds expanded but rather as baked beans to be processed and labeled. There 
is a neat reverse of this in Mario Savio’s speech outside Sproul Hall in 1964: ‘If this is a firm and 
the Board of Regents are the board of Directors [...], then the faculty are a bunch of employees 
and we’re the raw material. But we’re a bunch of raw material that doesn’t mean to be made into 
any product, don’t mean to end up being bought by some clients of the university. We’re human 
beings.’ (Harman, 1988: 38).
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demanded increased democratization of the universities, in the form of 
reduction of the universities’ hierarchical structures and an increase in 
 students’ rights of self-determination and co-determination.
Robert Lumley remarks about Italy that the whole university expansion 
process was conducted from above, without taking student opinion into 
account (Lumley, 1990). The same could be said about university expansion 
all across the globe. Thus the expanding university sector was ripening with 
potential conflicts over its purpose and ethos.
In terms of their social origins, most of those who provided the rapidly 
growing numbers of students still came from upper- and middle-class homes, 
although working-class access was improving. Also, the newer universities 
and colleges recruited a higher proportion of women students. In terms of 
their social destinations, however, most students could no longer expect to 
join the upper class, although some could entertain such hopes. Most would 
become salaried employees. They might not immediately see themselves as 
‘workers’ – though the big expansion of white-collar trade unionism suggests 
that many did learn to – but most could no longer expect to get beyond the 
fundamental insecurities and uncertainties of life as ‘employees’. (Over 
 subsequent decades, those uncertainties and insecurities would impinge 
more brutally on ‘white-collar’ sectors.)
But, while they were at university, many did not have clearly defined 
careers in front of them. Writing in the 1970s about the general situation 
of students, Callinicos and Turner suggested:
Students do not enjoy any definite relations to the productive process. While they are 
students, their careers remain uncertain. Their fate will be settled by imponderables 
like the state of the labour market and their performance in examinations. [...] Students 
are defined socially by their transitional situation. [...] The effect of the examination 
system is not to unite students into a cohesive group but to atomize them, each student’s 
fate is settled by his or her individual performance separated from that of all the others.
But they are an oppressed group... Insecurity about the future is soon reinforced by 
the isolation of life on the campus. Although the discipline is less rigid than at school, 
decisions about the content of courses, appointments, price levels or anything else 
remains just as remote. The corridors of power inside colleges are certainly not for 
the use of students, except on a few occasions and only then at the convenience of 
the authorities. This general alienation of students creates their readiness to rebel. 
(Callinicos and Turner, 1975)
It’s probably useful, however, to make some further discriminations 
among students, in terms of the subject-areas they entered. For many, 
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 university education represented a period of ‘apprenticeship’ to a given 
 profession or industry. The nature of the ‘disciplines’ they were required to 
study was well defined, and their education experience consisted in absorb-
ing and mastering a fixed set of theories, facts and meanings. This was largely 
true in law and medicine, in engineering and business subjects, in most of 
economics and natural science and in most schools of psychology. Here, 
although university conditions of study were probably better than in most 
technical colleges, in both kinds of institutions the ‘vocational training’ func-
tion predominated. Students themselves neither expected nor were expected 
to develop critical views about the curriculum. Additionally, many students 
went not to universities but to technical colleges, often on day- or block-
release. If these students were ‘the worst victims of our educational system 
at every stage in its operation’ (Harman et al., 1968: 24), they were also least 
likely to be affected by student movements, which tended to concentrate 
in the universities among full-time students, who possessed both the leisure 
and the social networks needed for debate and mobilization.
However, students in the Arts and Humanities and especially Social 
Science were not really ‘training’ for entry to specific professions, though 
many would expect to go into teaching, social work, various forms of 
administration, or work in the mass media. What they expected from their 
courses, and indeed were induced to expect, was some kind of nurturing 
of their ‘critical faculties’ and of their capacities for social, moral and polit-
ical generalization. These were the students most likely to be searching 
for something akin to the classical model of the University as a liberal 
institution promoting freedom of thought and expression, encouraging 
free debate and argument – in other words, the old upper class model of 
a university education devoted to the relatively leisured pursuit of ideas. 
These students were most likely to be disappointed by the reality of uni-
versity life, and – were radicalization to occur – the most likely to be 
responsive. They were the ones most likely to be disappointed by the 
 reality of much of their university experience, to find their courses boring, 
irrelevant and alienating. Gareth Stedman Jones described their situation 
in 1969:
These students are formally trained to develop a creative and critical intelligence: 
their future occupations often demand specialized and skilled verbal or conceptual 
performances. But at the same time, the universities and colleges where they study 
impose deadeningly conformist syllabuses and systematically segregated departments 
of knowledge. These apprentice intellectual workers are thus riven by a constant 
contradiction: they must be alert and intelligent within their narrowly defined disci-
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pline, and yet be numbed and inert outside it. They must not apply the intelligence 
they are being urged to develop, either to the institutions where they are studying or 
to the society which produces them. (Jones, 1969: 32-33)
While Carl Davidson cites a student from Brandeis University:
By the time we graduate, we have been painstakingly trained in separating facts from 
their meaning. [...] We wonder that our classes, with few exceptions, seem irrelevant 
to our lives. No wonder they’re so boring. Boredom is the necessary condition of any 
education which teaches us to manipulate the facts and suppress their meaning. 
(Davidson, 1969: 330)12
On the campuses, in the period before the eruption of student protest, 
the Left was generally weak. In the USA, McCarthyism had fatally weak-
ened the Communist Party’s position, while European Communist Parties 
had effectively abandoned specifically revolutionary politics in favour of 
parliamentarist aspirations. In some countries, there were small radical 
groupings. West Germany’s SDS had been expelled from the Social 
Democratic Party, and had a perspective consisting until the mid-1960s 
of ‘nothing much more than recruiting Marxist intellectuals, whose chief 
task was to be the re-establishment of a German workers’ movement’ 
(Budderberg, 1968: 27). The strongest ideological influence among them 
came from the ideas of Herbert Marcuse, for whom western working classes 
were hopelessly compromised by post-war affluence, so that any new 
 revolutionary impulses were only likely to come from third world revolu-
tions and marginal oppressed strata. Similar ideas also affected the emerg-
ing Students for a Democratic Society in the US, radicalised by the Civil 
Rights Movement but only to the stage that, in 1964, it adopted the slogan 
‘Half the way with LBJ’.13 The Japanese Zengakuren movement had frag-
12 See also the remarks by Mario Savio on student experience at Berkeley He summarizes: ‘Many 
of us came to college with what we later acknowledge were rather romantic expectations, perhaps 
mostly unexpressed at first, about what a delight and adventure learning would be. We really did 
have unanswered questions searching for words, though to say so sounds almost corny. But once 
at college we quickly lose much of the romantic vision; although, fortunately, some never give in 
to the disappointment. Discovering that college is really high school grown up and not significantly 
more challenging, many console themselves with the realization that it is not much more difficult 
either.’ (Draper, 1965: 3-5).
13 Lipset and Altbach suggest that the organized Left in the USA was quite small. They report a 
1965 estimate by the left-wing National Guardian that all the various ‘new left’ organizations in the 
US together counted about 12,000 members, with a similar number of sympathizers. SDS claimed 
20,000 members and supporters, out of a US student population of six million. On most campuses 
the organized Left was absent: a survey of Deans of Students in 849 institutions in response to 
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mented after its efforts in 1960 to make links with striking workers had been 
rebuffed. The French UNEF movement was weaker than it had been since 
it played a very positive role in opposition to the Algerian war.14 Elsewhere 
tiny Marxist grouplets had small footholds in a few places.
It was in this setting that student revolt exploded across the developed 
Western world.
Student	revolt
The first impulse towards student revolt occurred, not on a college campus, 
but in the ‘whites only’ coffee bar of a Woolworth store in Greenboro, 
North Carolina, in February 1960. Four Black students from the local college 
sat down and asked to be served coffee. Refused coffee, they continued to 
‘sit in’ all day. Next day, more students joined them, and the next day still 
more. Their action set off a wave of Black student sit-ins in segregated facil-
ities all across the Jim Crow south of the United States. For Black students 
over the next few years, something of the same dynamic applied that, for 
many Black churches, made church membership almost synonymous with 
belonging to the civil rights movement. McAdam cites two surveys, in 1962 
and 1964, finding that respectively 39 per cent and 69 per cent of Black 
 students were involved in the movement. ‘Participation in protest activity 
simply came to be defined as part and parcel of one’s role as a student.’ 
(McAdam, 1982). Bearing in mind that students from schools in the Deep 
South tended not to be involved, that suggests rates of activism among the 
rest of between 60 and 80 per cent. These Black student activists got little 
help from their college administrations. According to one survey, only 15 
per cent of the sit-in participants from public colleges reported that their 
administrations had been supportive. By the end of the 1960 spring term, 
more than a hundred students had been expelled from their colleges for 
student activism in 1964-5 reported that student radicals were totally absent in 74 per cent of them. 
(The Left undoubtedly grew in the second half of the 1960s, but still with a minority status.) On 
the other hand, the same authors report another poll revealing widespread student and faculty 
sympathy with the civil rights movement, in which 18 percent of students described themselves as 
having taken part in picket lines, ‘presumably mainly to enforce a civil rights objective’. That figure 
they found ‘rather large’ (Lipset and Altbach, 1967: 200-1). Mario Savio claimed that, at Berkeley, 
over 10 per cent of the student body had taken part directly in civil rights activity, in the South or 
in the Bay Area. ‘These three thousand, all of whom have at least walked picket lines, are a leaven 
for the campus. And many more can be said to have participated vicariously: there is great and 
widespread interest in what those who “go South” have done and experienced’ (Savio apud Draper, 
1965: 3).
14 UNEF membership declined from its Algerian war peak of 100,000; in 1968, despite the large 
growth in overall French student numbers, it had only 45-50,000 members, and was riven with 
internal struggles (Halliday, 1969: 317-8).
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their participation (Polletta, 2006). It seems, however, that these conservative 
college administrations did not provoke campus revolts.
Out of the Black students’ sit-in campaign was born the Student Non- 
-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), which in turn gave a powerful 
new impulse to the civil rights struggle, which had been languishing after 
initial victories in Montgomery, Alabama in 1956. In its early years, SNCC 
welcomed radicalizing white students into its ranks, and it was chiefly 
through them that the explosion of civil rights struggles of the early 1960s 
fed into student politics on American campuses, and from them to the 
world.15 In the summer of 1964, SNCC organized a programme called 
‘Freedom Summer’, which took quite large numbers of predominantly white 
middle-class students into Mississippi to help with a voter registration drive 
(McAdam, 1988). Mississippi racists murdered three students (one black, 
two white), but the general radicalizing effect on the one thousand and 
more who participated was profound. When they returned to their colleges 
in the autumn of 1964, they publicized the struggle in America’s Deep South 
on their home campuses. Among these were Mario Savio and Jack Weinberg, 
who would soon be projected into new and previously unknown roles as 
militant campus student leaders at Berkeley.
The	beginning,	Berkeley	191
At the start of the fall term in 1964, student activists, some of whom had 
been involved in Freedom Summer and other civil rights activities, set up 
information tables on the street outside the Berkeley campus of the Uni-
versity of California, soliciting donations and supporters for civil rights 
15 Bernice Johnson Reagon (Payne, 1995) called the US civil rights movement the ‘borning move-
ment’ of the 1960s, and Payne suggests that SNCC itself was ‘the borning organization’ of the same 
period. Out of it came, first, attempts at new models of activism, leadership and organization, which 
themselves influenced the practice and thinking of the early student movement (notably SDS), the 
anti-war movement, the women’s movement, and others. Later in its development, SNCC also 
played a major part in giving birth to the idea of ‘black power’. Within SNCC, too, one of the first 
position papers announcing the birth of ‘second-wave feminism’ was written. It is thus doubly 
possible to trace the roots of ‘identity politics’ within SNCC. Although never a very large organiza-
tion, SNCC’s history represents a critical hinge in the development of radicalism after 1960, and 
in that sense we are still living in its wake’ (Barker and Cox, 2002). The history of SNCC’s later 
implosion also provided a kind of ‘forerunner’ model of the implosions that afflicted many of the 
left organizations that grew out of the 1960s movements. There are fascinating reflections on the 
particular character of SNCC’s later development in chapter 3 of Polletta, 2006; see also Polletta, 
1994. On those later implosions, at least for Europe, see Harman: 1979. The idea of black power, 
in turn, inspired the later Black Panthers party, and movements like the Dodge Revolutionary 
Union Movement. For a useful introduction, see Shawki, 1990.
16 There’s an extensive collection of documents, photographs and other materials from the Berkeley 
Free Speech Movement on the web at http://www.fsm-a.org/.
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causes. On September 14, 1964, Dean Katherine Towle announced that, 
since the strip of land where the tables were set up belonged to the Univer-
sity, the tables were banned under existing University regulations. These 
prohibited advocacy of political causes or candidates, outside political 
speakers, recruitment of members, and fundraising by student organiza-
tions, anywhere on the university campus. The rules, she declared, would 
be ‘strictly enforced’. There were public confrontations at the tables between 
the university authorities and, among others, Mario Savio and Jack Wein-
berg, who won audiences when they spoke in defence of free speech. On 
1st October, Weinberg was arrested and placed in a police car in Sproul 
Plaza, inside the university area. Inspired by ideas from the civil rights move-
ment, several thousand students sat down around the car, trapping it (and 
its occupants) for the next 36 hours. Speakers climbed on top of the police 
car to address the large crowd in a permanent public meeting. The police 
charges against Weinberg were eventually dropped, and he was released.
A month late, however, the university brought its own disciplinary 
charges against those who organized the Sproul Plaza sit-in. The Free 
Speech Movement, as it was now called, responded with an occupation of 
Sproul Hall, an administration building, The university called in the cops, 
and on the night of 3rd December some 800 students were carried from 
the Hall to waiting paddy-wagons. The continuing crisis in the university 
led to the appointment of a new acting chancellor, who introduced new 
rules for on-campus political activity, including the designation of the steps 
to Sproul Hall as an area where political tables could now be set up and 
speeches made. The campus movement had secured a significant victory 
over a conservative administration, though the issues rumbled on into the 
spring, involving conflicts with the University of California as a whole, and 
its Regents.17
17 The Regents commissioned a report into the causes of the unrest at Berkeley, which was scathing 
about the university administration: ‘The University [...] displayed a consistent tendency to disor-
der its own principles and values. While dedicated to the maintenance of a house for ideas and 
thought, it proved selective in determining whose ideas would gain admittance. While upholding 
the value of a continuing discourse in the academic community, it refused to engage in simple 
conversation with the membership of that community. While positioned as the defender of man’s 
right to reason, it acted out of fear that a volatile public would react against the University if exposed 
to the reasonings of students. While championing the value of the individual and his responsibility 
for his own person, it had sought to prevent the individual from suffering the consequences of his 
own self-determined actions in society. While postured to avoid prejudgment of the facts, it sought 
to determine before the fact the legality or illegality of actions students would plan to take in the 
surrounding community. While responsible to and for itself, the University assumed it would be 
charged with responsibility for others, and in fear that the assumption would prove valid, established 
rules prohibiting others form acting on their own responsibility’ (The Byrne Report, cited in Draper, 
1965: 237).
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Heirich comments that there seemed to be a ‘kaleidoscope of crises’, 
involving seven more collective confrontations in the spring of 1965, in 
whose course the targets and foci of conflict kept shifting. 
With each shift in the focus of conflict, issues became more difficult to meet directly 
and to resolve – both because they were more general and because they came closer 
to the heart of genuine value dilemmas that higher education had failed to solve in its 
massive growth over the preceding twenty-five years. (Heirich, 1970; Weinberg, 1965)
At each stage, different levels of authority in the university were chal-
lenged: from the student affairs staff to the deans, and then to the president 
and chancellor and then to the Regents. When the state Governor inter-
vened, he was challenged by a university-wide strike. At each stage, the 
involvement of further authorities meant that a wider range of university 
relationships came into question, and under the students’ critical surveil-
lance. Weinberg points out that the civil rights campaign tables were not 
just aimed at racism in the Deep South, but at the practices and interests 
of powerful local employers in the Bay Area. Those interests, he suggests, 
pressured the university, which succumbed. In that sense, 
many conclude that the FSM is an extension of the civil rights movement... The 
University of California is a microcosm in which all of the problems of our society 
are reflected. Not only did the pressure to crack down on free speech at Cal come 
from the outside power structure, but most of the failings of the university are either 
on-campus manifestations of broader American social problems or are imposed upon 
the university by outside pressures. (Weinberg, 1965). 
Draper comments on the whole process:
One of the most unique features of the Berkeley student revolt is that from its begin-
ning to its climax it was linked closely to the social and political issues and forces of 
the bigger society outside the campus. At every step the threads ran plainly to every 
facet of the social system: there were overt roles played by big business, politicians, 
government leaders, labor, the press, etc., as well as the Academy itself. This was no 
conflict in the cloister. (Draper, 1965)
The broadening of the conflicts meant that the nature of the university 
as an institution came increasingly into question, along with its linkages to 
the national and state-wide power structure. All of this tended to radical-
ize sections of the student body.
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The very title of the movement, the Free Speech Movement, indicates 
the initial battle-ground between university authorities and students. Similar 
issues would resonate through later campus movements too. As an issue, 
‘freedom of speech’ possessed a large mobilizing capacity. Previous civil 
rights activity, both in the Deep South but also in the San Francisco Bay 
area, had already habituated quite large numbers of Berkeley students to 
organized collective action.18 The protest at Berkeley was not simply led by 
‘radicals’, but by a coalition that included quite diverse political forces: civil 
rights campaigners, radical, socialist and peace groups, but also the Young 
Democrats and all three Republican Clubs including the right-wing Youth 
for Goldwater (Draper, 1965: 31-2).19 There was something seemingly ‘non-
ideological’ about the student demands, which accounts in part for the very 
explosiveness of the student uprising: ‘This was the explosiveness of uncal-
culated indignation, not the slow boil of planned revolt [...] the first dis-
covery of the chasm between the rhetoric of Ideals and the cynicism of 
Power among the pillars of society’ (Draper, apud Harman, 1988: 44). On 
the other hand, the very fact that the coalition was so broad meant that it 
could, and did, easily fracture and disassemble almost as quickly as it was 
formed. Nonetheless, what Berkeley showed was that an initially small group 
of students could, faced with a university administration that lumbered into 
action almost unaware of the sleeping energies its own responses could pro-
voke, convert relatively small oppositional forces on a campus into a broad 
and wide-ranging student movement. If such movements lacked much by 
way of overall ‘staying power’, they were nonetheless, in the 1960s, an 
entirely novel development.20 They also provided a kind of political ‘forcing 
house’ in which numbers of the student participants became, through 
their experiences within the movement and the exposure this gave them to 
18 In March 1964, more than nine hundred people had been arrested during demonstrations at 
the Sheraton-Palace Hotel in San Francisco, including some two hundred from Berkeley (Heirich, 
1970: 45). According to one study, more than half of those who sat down round the police car in 
Berkeley plaza had taken part in at least one civil rights protest, and 17 per cent had participated 
in seven or more (Lipset and Altbach, 1967: 202). Savio claimed that over 10 per cent of the Berkeley 
student body had taken part directly in civil rights activity, in the South or in the Bay Area (Draper, 
1965: 3).
19 At the London School of Economics in 1967, the motion to occupy the college premises was 
moved by the former chair of the Conservative Society (Harman, 1988: 43).
20 Two American academics noted: ‘Recent events in American student political life have shown 
that it is possible to remove students from their liberal but generally apathetic tendencies during 
a crisis. When the chips are down, as they were in Berkeley, a large proportion of the students 
supported the militants of the Free Speech Movement, even though the overwhelming majority 
did not normally take part in politics and have not remained active in the student movement. 
Similarly, such students will back a movement for civil rights in the campus community.’ (Lipset 
and Altbach, 1967: 237-8)
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radical critiques of existing society, much more ready to engage in wider 
radical politics.
Hal Draper, himself a librarian at Berkeley, was one of the few ideolog-
ically formed socialists in the faculty who supported the students from the 
beginning. His critique of Clark Kerr’s ideas was very influential among 
the students who played a leading part in the early stages of the Berkeley 
movement.21 In the book he published in 1965, he attempted a political 
anatomy of the newly emerged generation of student radicals. If they were 
not, as he put it, ‘finished radicals’, they had identified themselves as radi-
cal rather than liberal. Still in the early stages of a process of radicalization, 
they tended to concentrate on the ‘issues’ and to be more certain what they 
were against than what they were for. Among them ‘[...] the reservoir of 
radical energies is greater than the stream of radical beliefs’. Their overt 
thinking was marked by a conscious avoidance of any particular radical 
 ideology. Disinclined to generalize and systematize their positions, they 
 preferred to be ‘pragmatic’, inclining to substitute a ‘moral’ approach for 
political and social analysis.22 He may well have had in mind a leading figure 
like Mario Savio, whose speech to students as they prepared to occupy 
Sproul Hall was reproduced all over the USA:
There’s a time when the operation of the machine becomes so odious, makes you 
so sick at heart, that you can’t take part, you can’t even passively take part, and 
you’ve got to put your bodies upon the gears and upon the wheels, upon the levers, 
upon all the apparatus, and you’ve got to make it stop! And you’ve got to indicate 
to the people who run it, to the people who own it, that unless you’re free, the 
machine will be prevented from working at all! (cited in http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Mario_Savio)
Draper cited several reasons for the Berkeley students’ rejection of 
 ‘ideology’: they were rejecting old ideologies, not yet having met any new 
ideology that might carry them away; they feared ideological clarity might 
threaten the unity of their movement; and the general political climate of 
mid-1960s America made them refuse labels like ‘socialist’. Their position 
had some advantages, in that it was harder to smear them with being ‘com-
munists’. The very unformed character of their ideas contributed to the 
21 Draper was the second speaker from the roof of the police car in Sproul Plaza, after Mario Savio.
22 Heirich has some materials from student essays about why they decided to join the FSM. They 
mix together moral arguments and beliefs, tactical commitments, a sense that the movement had 
generalized beyond a few radicals behind tables, expectations of success, and having friends who 
were participating (Heirich, 1970: 180-1).
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explosiveness of their movements, indeed they lacked the kind of ‘theoretical 
wisdom’ that told them they couldn’t win: a degree of naiveté and inexpe-
rience were as ‘shield and buckler’ to the student movement. At the same 
time, ideological weaknesses meant that they were ill-equipped to answer 
questions about what to do next after mass mobilizations had been achieved. 
Such movements could be tamed quite easily if the authorities recovered 
their poise and offered compromises that would quieten things down. They 
were liable to lack persistency in struggle, so the movements could rise and 
fade away with equal facility. ‘The simple/moral drive to action’ is more 
ephemeral than the ideological.’ (Draper, 1965: 156-166).
If Draper was at one immensely enthusiastic, and sceptical, about the 
potential of movements like those at Berkeley, he was analyzing a situation 
in statu nascendi, not knowing how it might develop.23 In the event, the 
Berkeley events did not immediately set off a rash of campus challenges to 
university authorities. In the United States, at least, other forms of student 
politics began to gain momentum. The American war in Vietnam slowly 
emerged as a core issue. Initially, the anti-war movement was tiny, but it 
grew through the new device of ‘teach-ins’ on many campuses, beginning 
at Ann Arbor, Michigan in 1965. The teach-ins provided Marxists with an 
audience they’d not enjoyed for many years: audiences of thousands listened 
to Isaac Deutscher in Washington and to Hal Draper at Berkeley, as they 
debated with government spokespeople and largely won the arguments. 
Later that year the anti-war demonstrations started to gain serious momen-
tum (Harman, 1988: 72). In turn, they fed back into campus radicalism, not 
only in the US, but in Europe.
The	movement	spreads
At Berlin’s Free University, a student movement erupted in spring 1965 
over free speech issues when the Rector banned a speaker invited by students 
to address them on the 20th anniversary of the Nazi defeat, and again when 
the university sacked an Assistent for criticizing the Rector in a letter to a 
Berlin newspaper (Boren, 2001; Seabury, 1967). Later that year, a Univer-
sity Senate ruling, that no university facilities could be used for political 
activities, set off a second student insurgency. Thousands of students took 
part in street demonstrations and strikes, with thousands more signing peti-
tions calling for reform of the administration.
23 Draper was to offer his own views about left strategy, arguing that the movement, to make 
lasting gains and develop ideological clarity, should ‘lay new track’ – to the American working class 
(Johnson, 1997). 
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The socialist student organization, the SDS, played the leading part in 
these and subsequent demonstrations. Originally the SDP’s student section, 
they had been expelled in 1960. Strongly influenced by the ideas of Marcuse, 
the SDS focused attention on anti-imperialist politics, notably against 
American policy in Vietnam and the Middle East. When Hubert Humphrey 
visited Berlin in 1967, they organized predominantly student demonstra-
tions against his presence, and in June that year, on a larger scale, they mobi-
lized demonstrations against the visit of the Shah of Iran. Police surrounded 
and violently attacked a student demonstration outside the Opera House, 
clubbing both demonstrators and bystanders. One student, Benno Ohnesorg, 
was kicked unconscious; as his unconscious body was dragged to a police 
wagon, an officer placed a gun to his head and shot him. Tens of thousands 
attended his memorial service, which became a huge protest for university 
and political reform, compelling the resignations of the Police Chief and 
SDP Mayor of West Berlin. As in Italy, the tendency of the police in 
Germany to respond with brutal violence to student protests conditioned 
the form that radicalization took (Della Porta, 1995; 1996).
The SDS provided a basis for the emergence of an ‘Extra-Parliamentary 
Movement’ (APO), whose immediate triggers were Germany’s support 
for the Vietnam war and the emergency legislation which was linked to 
 increasing repression of protestors. Budderberg (1968: 29) suggests that 
the demonstrations against the American war in Vietnam were especially 
significant in West Germany, in that they broke the long double taboo of 
anti-communism and opposition to the Americans (who contributed to 
Germany’s liberation from the Nazis, and maintained the ‘freedom’ of West 
Berlin). These and other student demonstrations shifted opinion in Germany. 
Where a poll of young people in spring 1967 had concluded that ‘young 
people have very little ideology [...]. They have only one ideology, “success”’, 
another poll in January 1968 showed 67 per cent of young people approving 
of the student demonstrations (Harman, 1988: 53). This kind of opinion-
shift accompanied rabid attacks on student radicals in the right-wing press 
empire of Axel Springer. Radical students certainly held the Springer press 
responsible for the serious wounding of the German student leader, Rudi 
Dutschke, by a right-wing would-be assassin who shot him in Berlin in April 
1968. This event, in turn, set off a round of student attacks on the offices 
and distributors of Springer newspapers. The German student movement 
peaked in April and May of 1968, as the anti-Springer demonstrations were 
rapidly followed by May Day demonstrations against the military dictator-
ship in Greece, strikes in almost all the German universities against emer-
gency laws introduced by the CDU-SDP ‘Grand Coalition’ government on 
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15-16 May, and a day of protest against Germany’s neo-Nazis on 18 May. 
In street battles across the country, two more protestors were killed.
After the summer of 1968, the APO rapidly fragmented. The passage of 
the emergency powers legislation drove some to cynicism and personalistic 
withdrawal. After its spring 1968 peak, SDS fell apart at its congress later 
that year. German radicalism was marked by two new developments. On 
one hand, there was the rise of the ‘Spontis’, sub-cultures involving partial 
withdrawal from political engagement, lifestyle responses in place of socialist 
and communist student politics. The growth of the ‘Spontis’ saw a turn to 
co-ops, bio-bakeries, alternative culture, and squatting. On the other hand, 
a small section of the German movement turned, despairing of mass protests, 
to individual and small-group terrorism (Zirakzadeh, 2006).
One thing that marked the German student movement was its almost 
total disconnection from the workers’ movement. Germany’s labour move-
ment in the postwar decades was among the least strike-prone in Europe. 
Most radical students readily accepted the arguments of writers like Marcuse 
and Fanon that the working class was no longer capable of acting as a 
 revolutionary subject, being co-opted and ideologically blinkered by com-
modity consumption. They looked instead to ‘non-commodified’ alterna-
tive revolutionary subjects: to students themselves as a ‘revolutionary class’, 
to outsiders like prisoners and the chronically unemployed, and to third 
world peasants and ‘lumpen-proletarians’. Budderberg refers to the ‘guer-
rilla-cult’ among German students, along with their Mao badges and 
Guevara posters. They also drew on the analyses of fascism produced within 
the Frankfurt School. These treated the present bourgeois capitalist system 
as ‘closed’ and ‘without the possibility of a concrete negation’, thanks to 
the ‘authoritarian character structure’ that consumerism and the media 
 produced among workers (Budderberg, 1968: 31). Their isolation from 
working-class support made the German student movement very self- 
-dependent, also encouraging a certain elitism towards the rest of society. 
It was one of the first student movements to decline and fade.
In France and Italy, and to a degree in Britain, by contrast, the story was 
somewhat different. In these three countries, in different ways, active inter-
sections between student and workers’ movements produced distinctive 
outcomes.
In France, the years 1965-68 witnessed a significant growth of working-
class militancy (Cliff and Birchall, 1968), partly manifested in a rising level 
of local strikes but also in larger, if symbolic strikes called by the largest 
union federation, the Communist Party-led CGT. There was no sense, 
 however, of a major crisis brewing. By comparison with their colleagues in 
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Germany or Italy, French students seemed more docile. When, at Easter 
1968, news came in of the attempted assassination of Rudi Dutschke in 
Berlin, French far left students called a demonstration in Paris. It mobilized 
at most 200 students, and promptly dispersed when the police appeared.24 
On the outskirts of Paris, at the Nanterre university campus, however, a 
little trouble was brewing. There, a small anarchist group raised demands 
about Vietnam on the one hand, and sexual liberation on the other. Their 
agitation bore fruit, not so much because of student political acuity as 
because of the authorities’ lack of it. Daniel Cohn-Bendit and others from 
the Nanterre students were summoned to the Sorbonne to answer charges, 
shifting the conflict from the suburbs to the city centre. When Sorbonne 
students demonstrated in support of the Nanterre students, the university 
called in the police, who attacked the students, further raising the temper-
ature, and drawing in larger student numbers. On 3 May, the authorities 
decided to close the Sorbonne, no doubt hoping that approaching exami-
nations would turn most students to their studies. The miscalculation was 
immense: for a week there were daily student demonstrations and clashes 
with the police, who used batons and CS gas.
The climax came on the night of Friday 10 May, when students defending 
themselves in the Latin Quarter began building barricades. All night 30,000 
of them fought the hated CRS riot police, swinging public sympathy towards 
them. Next day, faced with a decision of the CGT to call a one-day national 
strike in solidarity with the students, the prime minister, Pompidou, 
announced the immediate re-opening of the Sorbonne and indicated that 
imprisoned students would be released. But it was too little and too late. 
The initiative passed from the government.
Monday 13 March saw a very large – perhaps a million-strong – demon-
stration in Paris, with participants waving handkerchiefs and chanting 
‘Adieu De Gaulle’ with great merriment. The Communist Party deployed 
large numbers of its cadre to act as stewards, chiefly to keep the (‘ultra-left’) 
students apart from the workers’ contingents. The same day, students 
 occupied the main buildings of the re-opened Sorbonne.
The CGT leaders had clearly intended that, in line with previous practice, 
the one-day strike would provide an opportunity to demonstrate their con-
tinued strength, and to allow workers to ‘let off steam’ in the demonstra-
tion. And there things might have ended, with the students occupying the 
24 I was there. Afterwards, a student member of the Socialisme ou Barbarie group moaned to me 
about the ‘a-political and cowardly’ character of French students, declaring that he would like to 
move to Britain, where at least there was a lively anti-Vietnam movement. This was six weeks before 
the ‘May events’.
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Sorbonne for a while and finally fading away. But on Tuesday, workers at 
the Sud-Aviation aircraft factory at Nantes on the Atlantic coast occupied 
their plant and locked up the management in their offices. Initially this 
attracted little attention, but within days similar occupations were launched 
in workplaces up and down France. The strike movement was set in motion 
by local groups of militant activists, without reference to the leaders of the 
union federations. Initially taken aback by these developments, the union 
leaderships stepped in to encourage a movement they had not initiated, so 
as not to lose control. Within two weeks, more than nine million workers 
were on strike, across every sector of society, in the largest single general 
strike Europe had ever experienced. During the strike, while there were 
some notable and interesting examples of workers extending control over 
the production and distribution processes, only in a few occupied work-
places was the strike run by a democratically elected strike committee, More 
often unions imposed strike committees which commonly did not involve 
the mass of strikers in much decision or action (Birchall, 1987).
Left-wing students tried to forge links with striking workers. When they 
succeeded, the results could be dramatic. One memoir by a Renault worker 
recalls:
In the first few days of May every evening I took five or six workers – quite often 
members of the Communist Party – in my car to the Sorbonne. When they returned 
to work next day they were completely changed people. Through the students and the 
‘groupuscules’ they got the political education they did not get from the CP. There was 
a completely libertarian atmosphere at the university, so different from the totalitarian 
atmosphere at the factory. The student demonstration created an environment in which 
people were free to coin their own slogans. In the official trade union demonstrations, 
only certain, centrally determined, slogans were permitted. When Renault was occupied, 
the workers experienced a change from control by the management which uses modern 
manipulative techniques, to control by the CP bureaucracy, which is completely totali-
tarian. In Renault their freedom was alienated. In the Sorbonne they felt free. When a 
worker went to the Sorbonne he was recognized as a hero. Within Renault he was only 
a thing. In the university he became a man. This atmosphere of freedom in the sense of 
being human gave great combativity to the young workers. (cited in Birchall, 1987: 21)
Fearing more of this kind of ‘contagion’, the CP and CGT worked hard 
to keep students and workers apart. When a large student demonstration 
marched from the Sorbonne to the Renault factory at Billancourt, to show 
solidarity with the occupying workers, the factory gates were shut tight 
against them – by the strike committee.
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While the student movement could provide much of the ‘colour’ of the 
May events, it could not shape developments in the general strike move-
ment. Even though perhaps a third of the strikers actually belonged to one 
of the three trade-union confederations, those bodies nonetheless main-
tained a grip over the progress of the strike. There was no significant 
rank-and-file movement ‘from below’, based on the striking workplaces 
themselves, and capable of defining the forms of organization and goals of 
the strike movement. Thus, from late May onwards, the union leaders – and 
especially the CGT – were able to organize a return to work on the basis of 
pay increases negotiated in the Grenelle agreements with the employers – 
this despite serious expressions of dissatisfaction even in CGT strongholds 
like Renault Billancourt. The movement which, at some points, appeared 
to herald a veritable social revolution, thus ended quite tamely. The return 
to work also greatly reduced the impetus of the student movement. After 
May-June 1968, although there was some increase in the membership and 
audiences of the left-wing ‘groupuscules’, the French student movement 
did not again achieve any great prominence.
That said, the imaginations of students across Europe and beyond were 
entranced by the example of the French students, who had seemingly been 
able to ‘detonate’ a full-scale social crisis involving millions of workers. The 
‘May events’ contributed, internationally, to a widespread revival of inter-
est in revolutionary socialist ideas. If the movements of the 1960s had a 
‘peak’, it was surely reached in France.
Yet it was probably in Italy that the idea of student-worker alliances was 
taken furthest, even if nothing quite like ‘the French May’ occurred there. 
As Ginsborg suggests, ‘[t]he Italian protest movement was the most pro-
found and long-lasting in Europe. It spread from the schools and universi-
ties into the factories, and then out again into society as a whole’ (Ginsborg, 
1990: 298). Lumley refers, not inaptly, to the ‘organic crisis’ in Italy 1968-9 
(Lumley, 1990: 9, 47).
The Italian student movement found its initial basis in material demands. 
There had been a big expansion in student numbers, without a concomi-
tant growth in facilities. Where in 1923 40,000 students were served by 
2,000 lecturers, by 1967 there were 450,000 students but only 3,000 lecturers 
(Harman, 1988: 138). Teaching was poor, and matched by book and library 
shortages, so that only 25-30 per cent of students succeeded in completing 
their studies. One of the first campus movements developed in 1967 among 
architecture students at the Polytechnic in Milan, where generalised criti-
cism of government planning went hand in hand with a critique of the form 
of education on offer. The students occupied their college for 55 days 
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(Lumley, 1990). At the Catholic University of Trento, during the autumn 
of 1967, students attempted to formulate a Marxist analysis of students’ 
role in society. Students at the even more Catholic University at Milan 
 followed them with a struggle, initially over fees, that rapidly sought to 
 generalise. At Milan, the Rector called in the police, provoking among 
 students ‘indignation, suffering and deeply troubled Christian feelings in 
the face of the authorities’ behaviour’ (Ginsborg, 1990: 303). As Lumley 
(1990: 80) remarks, had the rector not called the cops, it seems likely 
this mobilization would have fizzled out, especially since at that time 
(mid-November 1967) there was no national student movement. But the 
Rector at Milan, like university heads across the world in this period, took 
it for granted that ‘authoritative’ measures were needed to ‘restore order’: 
without such authorities, could there ever have been student movements? 
Milan was followed by Turin, where students rejected the Education 
Minister’s proposals for university reform: these suggested cuts in student 
numbers and the introduction of a hierarchy of courses and of students. 
Here, for the first time in Italy, teaching, course content and the examina-
tion system came under their first concerted student attack. Over the winter, 
most Italian universities joined the fray, along with some secondary schools. 
In January 1968 alone, 36 universities were occupied (Lumley, 1990: 66). 
At Turin and Trento, students began interrupting lectures to ask professors 
questions arising from the issues debated in student assemblies. The pro-
fessoriat indignantly turned against the students, providing few sympathisers 
for their movement (Ginsborg, 1990: 303). A further turning point was 
reached in Rome in February, where students were involved in pitched 
 battles with the police. 
From the start of 1968, the university movement spread to high schools, 
including the coordination of strikes through Milan’s upper secondary 
schools. Most high-school teachers were unsympathetic to the students’ 
 critique of pattern of education; indeed ‘it took the student movement to 
create a generation of teachers committed to more democratic and egali-
tarian methods’ (Lumley, 1990: 94-98). 
The whole Italian movement was marked by a strong anti-authoritarian 
character, with students’ developing critique of society extending to the 
nuclear family and the traditional parties of the Left. Here too, although 
the Italian student movement was ‘less theoretical’ than in Germany, 
Marcuse’s ideas were influential.25 The movement provoked a ‘moral panic’, 
25 Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man sold 150,000 copies within a year of its publication in 1967 
(Lumley, 1990: 122).
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not only in conservative circles but also in the ranks of the Communist Party. 
In the wake of the Rome battles, the film-maker, Pier Paolo Pasolini, 
 published a poem attacking the students from the side of the policemen he 
described as ‘true proletarians’ (Ginsborg, 1990: 307; Lumley, 1990: 74).26
After the spring of 1968, however, campus issues faded away. Unlike 
German students, the idea never caught hold among Italian students that 
they were ‘the revolutionary class’. One participant recalled that ‘after the 
struggles of ‘68 a large number of students were no longer interested in the 
university [...] it was no longer where they socialized and its struggles 
appeared to them to be futile and folkloristic’ (Lumley, 1990: 112). They 
turned, rather, towards the factories. In March 1968, a strike and demon-
stration over pensions drew support on a much bigger scale than had been 
expected. Then, in May, news of the thrilling events in France raised the 
level of confidence and excitement, impelling militant students towards 
working-class struggle.
This turn coincided with a sharp shift in the forms of student organiza-
tion. Where the campus struggles had involved mass student assemblies 
and forms of ‘participatory democracy’, students now rushed to build what 
they saw as ‘Leninist’ organizations. If France had proved the need to build 
a revolutionary alternative to the Communist Party, that project required 
organization, ideology, discipline and revolutionary strategy. Drawing on a 
mixture of partly mythologized third world revolutionary movements, 
 students combined ideas taken from ‘guerrilla foci’ and Chinese and 
Vietnamese party structures.27 One Milan student document declared: ‘only 
the working class can make the revolution, but whilst capital has its police 
[...] the student movement is the guerrilla force of the working class in as 
far as it creates disorganization and disorder’. Students identified themselves 
less as students, and rather in various ways as detonators, ideologues, leaders, 
and guerrillas. ‘After the dramatic events at Fiat during the industrial dispute 
of June-July 1969 when mass meetings involved thousands of workers and 
students, it seemed that the overthrow of capitalism was a real possibility’ 
26 In early May 1968 the Communist Party Secretary issued a self-critical article admitting errors 
in party policy towards students and speaking of a ‘certain erosion in the internal life of the Party’ 
(Halliday, 1969: 306). 
27 Lumley comments on the Italian student Left, ‘The particular predilection for myths is clearly 
manifested in their fascination for China. China acted as a sort of spiritual homeland for a genera-
tion which could no longer believe in the USSR. Much of the young Italian intelligentsia of the 
period greatly admired the Chinese Cultural Revolution. China represented a model of how intel-
lectuals could work with and among the people. [...] At the same time, Chinese culture was presented 
as the combination of popular wisdom and a sophisticated but simple Marxism. [...] Above all, 
there was an image of Chinese people as hard-working but happy. [...]’ (Lumley, 1990: 127-8).
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(Lumley, 1990: 114). There rapidly emerged a number of competing groups, 
together making up the largest revolutionary left in Europe, but one that 
was ferociously divided, incapable of unity in action, and prone to (male) 
leader cults. Believing that revolution was just around the corner, these 
groups were not well adapted to understanding the roots of reformism in 
unions and parties, and outside the younger semi-skilled workers in the big 
factories of the North.
In time, these features would reveal major weaknesses. But in the imme-
diate situation, between the autumns of 1968 and 1969, ‘the groups lived a 
magical moment, as significant numbers of workers were attracted to their 
ideas’ (Ginsborg, 1990: 313). The scale of industrial conflict during the Hot 
Autumn of 1969 gave Italy the third largest strike movement recorded in 
history in terms of lost working time, exceeded only by 1968 in France and 
1926 in Britain. Additionally, Italian workers went further than either British 
or French in the challenges they issued to the organization of work and 
authority in the factory. For a period, the unions lost the initiative to rank 
and file committees in the factories. Workers put forward new demands, 
including reductions in differentials, better control over safety and condi-
tions, a breach in the link between wages and productivity. And they did 
this using new forms of struggle, involving mass assemblies as means of 
decision-making, and a plethora of wildcat strike forms (Regalia, Regini and 
Reyneri, 1978; Tarrow, 1989a).28 The temperature of the time was illustrated 
by the chant on a demonstration of Fiat workers and students: ‘What do 
we want? Everything!’
If the union leaders took longer to recoup their position than their French 
colleagues the previous year, they nonetheless proved able to adapt to 
 changing conditions and ‘ride the tiger’ of worker militancy – partly by 
relaxing party control over themselves. They won major concessions from 
employers in the autumn of 1969. As it turned out, the outcome of ‘the “hot 
autumn” [...] was not a further development of the revolutionary trend of 
the previous year, but rather the reassertion of trade union leadership in 
28 Tarrow catches something of the atmosphere: ‘The extension of the strike to the plant level was 
more than quantitative; it reflected a flowering of new strike forms, some inherited from past cycles 
of industrial conflict, but others invented on the spot. [...] A whole new vocabulary of strike forms 
rapidly developed, from the sciopero bianco (go-slow), to the sciopero a singhiozzo (literally, hiccup 
strikes) to the sciopero a scacchiera (chessboard strikes) to the corteo interno (marches around the 
factory grounds to carry along undecided workers) to the presidio al cancello (blocking factory gates 
to prevent goods from entering or leaving the plant).’ These varied forms of strike were combined 
with different forms of collective action, both within and outside the plant. They often ‘contained 
symbolic military elements’ but also ‘important elements of play and theatre and bore a resemblance 
to the traditional carnival’ (Tarrow, 1993: 296).
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the factories’ (Ginsborg, 1990: 318). Lumley concurs: ‘[...] during the Hot 
Autumn the unions recouped some of the prestige they had lost in previous 
months. This enabled them to monopolize negotiations over the contracts 
and to re-establish control over shopfloor organization’. The new contract 
signed at the end of 1969 was generally seen as a major victory for the 
 workers, and a defeat for the bosses, but ‘its effects on the social movement, 
which had seen a good contract as a common goal likely to benefit all 
 workers, were complex’ (Lumley, 1990: 243, 249). It undermined and reined 
in mobilization, as workers hoped to recoup money lost during the 
 stoppages. On the other hand, it had nothing like the demobilizing effect 
of the Grenelle agreements in France in ‘68. Conflicts continued over con-
tract implementation, with mass action still seen as the most effective way 
to make gains: there were 4,000 strikes in 1970. Nevertheless, after 1969 
there was not the same élan and sense of unity between workers and revo-
lutionary students.
In the factories, a new system of factory councils provided more work-
place control over union policy, and union membership grew by more than 
half between 1968 and 1975. But the period 1971-3 was one of deepening 
economic crisis, and union policy shifted from attack to defence. After 1973, 
as the economic crisis worsened, the balance of workplace power shifted 
back towards the employers and factory councils declined in importance.
The years after 1968 also saw a flourishing of other movements in Italy. 
The dominant models of revolutionary left organization were ill-adjusted 
to these new developments, especially to the growth of the women’s move-
ment. This period also saw a small section of the Italian left turn towards 
the terrorism of the Brigata Rossi, a response of elitist impatience. Ginsborg 
(1990: 340-342) suggests some reasons why the left’s revolutionary aspira-
tions failed. They suffered from their sectarianism, and their domination 
by models drawn from Third World national liberation movements, but 
above all from the weaknesses of their understanding of their own society. 
Too much focused on the large factories of the North, and prone to exag-
gerate immediate revolutionary prospects and to underestimate the popular 
roots of reformism, they could displace the old 1960s student organizations 
but not so easily the Italian Communist Party or the union leaderships. 
What Ginsborg doesn’t explore, however, is how a more realistically rooted 
revolutionary politics might have fared. With better politics, the later implo-
sion of the revolutionary groups in the later 1970s might have been avoided.
In Britain, the student movement was initiated at the London School of 
Economics, where students occupied in protest at the appointment as 
 college head of Walter Adams, formerly an ally of the racist regime in 
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Rhodesia. Radicalization was slower here than in Italy: the first student 
 banner read ‘Down with the pedagogic gerontocracy’ and it was two years 
before the cry became ‘Free free the LSE, free it from the bourgeoisie’ 
(Harman, 1988: 45). Like the Berkeley movement, the LSE struggle initially 
seemed to be an isolated occurrence, and did not immediately set off strug-
gles elsewhere. The growth of the movement against the Vietnam War, and 
the impulses flowing from the May events in France, provided the major 
impetus. Occupations at Hull University and the Hornsey College of Art 
were more in the nature of challenges to the system itself than local-issue 
campaigns. 1969 saw a big growth in campus revolts, in which issues to do 
with university ‘files’ came to the fore. At Warwick University, occupying 
students discovered that the university was collaborating with local employ-
ers in spying on both students and faculty members, and in refusing appli-
cations from would-be students on political ground. At Birmingham, files 
from Warwick were published, revealing intolerable racist conditions 
imposed on work in the new teaching hospital in Salisbury, Rhodesia by the 
Smith regime: these led Birmingham University Senate to phase out its links 
with University College, Rhodesia (Thompson, 1970). At Leeds, students 
discovered that college porters were being ordered to pry into student 
 political activities in the student halls, uncovering a history of spying on 
 lecturers and students by the secret services. Many of the student struggles 
in Britain conformed to the picture drawn by two American commentators:
Student political rebellion tends to break out when a series of events which violate 
the liberal bureaucracy’s norms set off shocks among those students who have not 
yet been sufficiently assimilated into the corporative system. The university admin-
istration is the de facto ruler of academia. It not only has the power to move against 
student dissidents; it is also often able to use the weapon of time to its advantage. It 
can forbid, harass, abolish and destroy student institutions and activities; and it can 
do so just prior to the final exam when students are away from the campus or between 
semesters. Nevertheless, the administrators are sometimes forced to drop their liberal 
façade. When their informal mechanisms of control give way to vulgar manipulation 
and repression a critical stage is reached. Expansion along these lines by university 
elites moves students to act to protect their rights. (James Jacobs and James Petras, 
cit Harman et al., 1968: 54)
The quite common pattern, seen equally in Berkeley, in Berlin or in Paris, 
involved a quite small minority of radical or revolutionary students seizing 
the opportunity provided when college administrations turned to authorita-
rian measures to contain or crush incipient student rebellions, and managing 
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to rally much larger numbers of students behind them around essentially 
‘liberal’ demands about freedom of speech and the like. Thus 3,000 students 
at Manchester University occupied the administration buildings in 1969 
after the Vice-Chancellor secured an injunction forbidding three named 
officers of the student Socialist Society from addressing a students’ union 
meeting.29 
However, if a large part of the student body was willing to take collective 
action in defence of liberal rights, not all of them were in any meaningful 
sense ‘radical’. When the immediate struggle was over, most returned to 
their studies and careers. At the same time, a minority was quite often 
 ‘radicalized’ by the experience of collective action, and it was this minority 
that was open to joining actual radical and socialist groupings. In the excite-
ment of the rapid expansion of student movements, this was often ignored 
or forgotten. Some left-wing thinkers, in Britain and elsewhere linked to 
the Fourth International and to the journal New Left Review, elaborated a 
political theory in this period according to which the universities would 
become ‘red bases’ from which more general assaults on the capitalist system 
might be launched. Ernest Mandel of the FI declared ‘the university can be 
the cradle of a real revolution’ (Callinicos and Simon, 1975: 122). Alain 
Geismar in France declared, ‘We want to make the university into a bastion 
from which we can pursue the struggle against capitalism’ (Halliday, 1969). 
In line with this, Alexander Cockburn offered a strategy in which ‘the 
 emergent student revolutionaries aim to turn the tables on the system, by 
using its universities and colleges as base areas from which to undermine 
other key institutions of the social order’ (Cockburn, 1969). The strategic 
proposal rested on an analogy, almost by association, with Maoist and 
Guevarist notions of ‘bases’ and ‘foci’. James Wilcox argued: ‘The guerrilla’s 
liberated zone is initially located in those areas which are geographically 
inaccessible to the repressive forces of the established order. We must ask 
ourselves whether the complex structures of late capitalism do not contain 
areas sociologically inaccessible to the repressive forces of the ruling class’ 
(Barnett, 1969; Fernbach, 1969; Triesman, 1969; Wilcox, 1969).30 Fred 
Halliday saw student power on the campus (with joint control with aca-
demics) as an attainable goal: ‘There is no doubt about the practical and 
political feasibility of liberated institutions of higher education, acting as 
base areas for general revolutionary struggle’ (Halliday, 1969). Robin 
29 The Manchester administration looked especially foolish when it turned out they had the wrong 
names, relying on the previous year’s society list!
30 The students of Athens Polytechnic, whose gates were smashed down by Papadopoulos’s tanks 
in 1973, put that inept proposition to the ultimate test.
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Blackburn put out a leaflet to the LSE Socialist Society declaring, in rhetoric 
that might have been borrowed from the Communist Party’s ‘Third Period’, 
‘[...] those who reject the strategy of the Red Bases and the tactic of the 
New Year offensive will be in serious danger of becoming the objective 
allies of social imperialism and social fascism’ (cited Callinicos and Simon, 
1975: 12). The key problem with the ‘red bases’ notion was its failure to 
take account of the impermanence and inner contradictions of the ‘bases’ 
themselves. Generalities about a ‘new student vanguard’ ignored the vast 
numbers of students who remained untouched by the new militancy, and 
the episodic attachment even of many of those who did briefly join campus 
struggles.31
In British workplaces, the 1960s witnessed an almost continuous rise in 
the numbers of small-scale, local ‘unofficial’ strikes, many of them, in con-
ditions of full employment, so short they did not reach the notice of the 
official statisticians (Cliff and Barker, 1966; Donovan, 1968). The strikes 
were called and led by shop stewards rather than paid trade-union officials, 
and commonly concerned not just pay but local challenges to managerial 
power. Although uncoordinated, an official inquiry declared there was ‘anar-
chy’ on the shopfloor in British industry (Donovan, 1968). Moves, first by 
the Labour Government (to 1970) and then by the Tories (1970-74) to 
 ‘regulate’ industrial relations shifted the form of strikes: while the number 
of ‘unofficial’ strikes declined, they were replaced by large, semi-politicized 
strikes and national demonstrations against anti-union and pay-control 
 legislation. Two struggles especially defined the period. In 1972, the miners 
broke the pay freeze with a massively effective strike, and the London 
 dockers broke the Industrial Relations Act. In both strikes, solidarity action 
by other workers played a crucial part (Darlington and Lyddon, 2001). For 
left-wing students the chief focus was now not Vietnam but solidarity with 
workers’ struggles. Talk of ‘red bases’ faded away. In early 1974, in face of 
continued union challenges, the Tories called a general election on the theme 
‘who governs?’ and lost to Labour.
Note should also be made of a few other countries in which student rebel-
lions occurred, with very mixed results. In Eastern Europe, in March 1968, 
Warsaw university students were involved in significant protests against the 
‘communist’ regime. Their movement was crushed, with a few of their aca-
demic sympathizers losing their jobs. The Polish student movement in 1968 
31 There were ‘new left’ commentators who did recognize this: see for example Davidson, 1969. 
Davidson also had a better sense than some excited commentators about how student consciousness 
develops, and about the need for radicals to be respectful towards the majority and their struggles, 
rather than just denouncing them as ‘backward’.
some Reflections on student Movements of the 1960s and Early 1970s | 
met with no answering echo from the workers. When, two years later, the 
coastal workers in Gdansk and Szczecin revolted against the regime, in 
struggles that included a massacre of workers at the Paris Commune 
 shipyard and the first formation of Inter-Factory Strike Committees, the 
workers in their turn fought alone (Baluka and Barker, 1977; Laba, 1991). 
Not until 1980, with the emergence of the Polish ‘Solidarity’ movement, 
did workers, intellectuals and students found common cause. In 1980, 
 however, it was the workers who ‘detonated’ the struggle, with students 
organizing on Poland’s campuses in the wake of the workers’ extraordinary 
victories (Barker, 1986; Goodwyn, 1991).
In Yugoslavia in 1968, Tito deflated the student movement by addressing 
the nation and declaring his support for the students’ action programme. 
Only after the movement had subsided, some weeks later, did the regime 
close the centre of agitation, Belgrade’s famous Philosophy and Sociology 
Faculty, and take disciplinary action against its leaders. Tito had perhaps 
learned something from abroad. Had he sent in the police initially, he might 
have provoked the same kind of response that de Gaulle’s government met 
with in France.
In Czechoslovakia, both in the ‘Czech spring’, and in the movement of 
opposition to the Russian invasion of August 1968, students played a part, 
but never one that differentiated them significantly from the rest of the 
 population’s resistance.
The autumn of 1968 saw two other significant movements. In Mexico, 
the late 1960s witnessed the emergence of an urban counter-culture, La 
Onda (The Wave), involving coffee-houses, pot, rock music, new clothing 
and hair styles, all of them subject to regular police raids and repression. 
By the spring of 1968 there were huge protests. More than 100,000 in 
Mexico City participated in demonstrations which reached beyond students 
to teachers, public employees, even some small business owners. The move-
ment declined somewhat over the summer, due in part to uncertainty about 
the way forward. Then came the appalling event of 3 October 1968, only 
days before the opening of the Olympic Games. A demonstration of between 
five and fifteen thousand marched against government heavyhandedness. 
In the Plaza of Tlatelolco, the demonstrators were deliberately fired on by 
5,000 security and military police, with at least 200 killed, several thousand 
more injured, and 2,000 arrested and tortured. If the massacre silenced the 
movement for some time, it damaged the legitimacy of the ruling PRI, in 
ways that were felt for decades after (Zirakzadeh, 2006).
In Northern Ireland’s sectarian Orange state, it was students who first 
formed the nascent Civil Rights Movement, whose demonstrations were 
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savagely repressed, provoking rioting and sectarian attacks on Catholic com-
munities. The British army was soon drawn in, and Northern Ireland entered 
a period of drawn-out civil war in which any space for specifically student 
movements was massively restricted.
Back in the United States, if the example of the Berkeley movement had 
been slow to spread, Black students at some of America’s elite African- 
-American universities were involved in successful campus protests which 
spread from opposition to segregated business establishments to challenges 
to the college curricula. Students at Columbia University in New York 
 occupied administration buildings in protest at the University’s links with 
Department of Defense contracts connected with the Vietnam War and, 
simultaneously, against the University’s plans to take over land occupied by 
Black people’s housing to build a University gymnasium. The Columbia 
struggle was scarred at times with factional infighting, and involved at least 
two pitched battles with New York police (Boren, 2001: 172-6). 1968 saw 
student rebellion return to Berkeley for the second time, and also generalize 
across much of the university sector. In the academic year 1968-9 70 per 
cent of private universities and 43 per cent of public universities reported 
‘severe student unrest’, often involving battles with the police. The climax 
of the American student protest movement came in spring 1970. Students 
at Kent State University in Ohio organized a protest in the wake of the US 
bombing of Cambodia. When the National Guard were sent onto the 
 campus, they shot dead four students and injured nine more on 4 May.32 
The shock of this event set off America’s largest ever student protest, 
 involving some four million students and reaching into high schools and 
even junior high schools. Two weeks later, local police killed two black stu-
dents at Jackson State University in Mississippi, forcing President Nixon 
to order a federal inquiry (Spofford 1988).33 It would take America’s final 
retreat from Vietnam, in 1975, to bring America’s student rebellions finally 
to an end.
The	Student	Left
The development of student movements, and the radicalization that accom-
panied them, was the chief source of a ‘new left’, especially within western 
capitalism. While the particular shape and tempo in each country was 
 different, and conditioned partly by developments outside the universities 
32 There is a website devoted to the events at Kent State at http://www.may4.org/.
33 See also www.aaregistry.com/african_american_history/1660/Killings_at_Jackson_State_Uni-
versity.
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– and especially by the specific domestic pattern of working-class struggle – 
there were some similarities. Of all the movements in this period, it was 
 perhaps the student movement which most tended to pick up ideas across 
national borders. Students were relatively mobile geographically, and quick 
to pick up ideas from other student insurgencies.34
Anyone moving to the left in the 1960s had to sort out some kind of posi-
tion on a whole number of critical international and national questions. In 
the Cold War, they must choose whether to support ‘Moscow’ or reject both 
the USA and the USSR. With struggles continuing in colonial and semi-
colonial territories, they must decide whether to support national libera-
tion movements, and – if so – whether to accept or criticise the ‘socialist’ 
claims that these movements, or their successor states, regularly made. They 
had to take a stance with respect to the increasingly overt pro-capitalist 
character of social-democratic parties, and to the practical reformism of 
western Communist Parties. If, as many did, they looked for ‘revolutionary’ 
answers, they still had to determine an attitude to the appeals of Maoism 
as a current apparently critical of Russian communism, and with it the ‘guer-
rilla’ politics associated with the name of Che Guevara. Crucially, they must 
assess the potential for radical and even revolutionary activity and organi-
zation among workers in the advanced capitalist states, after two decades 
of sustained economic boom and rising living standards. Plus, in the United 
States civil rights movement, but also in Northern Ireland, there were 
 questions about the role of organized religion in social struggles. All these, 
and other issues, were fiercely debated, and provided the basis for a very 
 fractious left scene.
As we’ve seen, in Europe the predominant intellectual influences came 
from figures like Herbert Marcuse, Frantz Fanon and Che Guevara, with 
Maoism also gaining a major influence. In the USA, where Draper had com-
mented in 1965 on the ‘non-ideological’ nature of much student radical-
ism, the emerging national student movement, Students for a Democratic 
Society, faced a choice, Draper suggested, between ‘permeationism’ and 
‘left opposition’. Where the previous generation of American radicals had 
mostly plumped for ‘permeation’ of the Democratic Party, the new gener-
ation rejected this. But what, then, should they do? SDS, which still went 
‘half the way with LBJ’ in 1964, radicalised, but not towards working-class 
34 A small example. Students at Manchester University learned that Warsaw students had 
responded to an official Communist Party speaker, not by heckling him but by applauding his 
every word with ironic over-enthusiasm. The next speaker in Manchester from the Conservative 
Party was greeted with similar ‘enthusiasm’, and quite drowned out by the ironic singing of 
patriotic songs.
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politics. The SDS’s Tom Hayden explained, in terms German radical 
 students would have understood,
[...] the traditional left expectation of irreconcilable and clashing class interests has 
been defied. It appears that the American elite has discovered a long-term way to 
stabilize or cushion the contradictions of our society. [Hence the only way to break 
elite control is] [...] to oppose American barbarism with new structures and opposing 
identities. These are created by people whose need to understand their society and 
govern their own existence has somehow not been canceled by the psychological 
damage they have received.
Who might these people be? In America, the intellectuals (C. Wright 
Mills’s last hope) disappointed, students initially attempted to organize 
‘the poor’, rather as SNCC was seeking to organise poor blacks. However, 
the results of the ‘community organising’ work that SDS undertook were 
 disappointing, and soon SDS was back on the campuses. The new left 
did not immediately identify itself with any concrete alternative to the 
American ‘democracy’ it found increasingly implausible. Paul Potter, 
president of SDS, refused to give a name to ‘the system’ in 1965, and 
the following year Carl Oglesby called it ‘corporate liberalism’. Potter 
later wrote that he had deliberately not called it ‘capitalism’ on the 
grounds that the term was inadequate – ‘a hollow, dead word tied to the 
thirties and a movement that had used it freely but without compre-
hending it. [...] I wanted ambiguity [...]. I sensed there was something 
new afoot in the world [...] that made rejection of the old terminology 
part of the new hope for radical change in America’ (Epstein, 1991). 
Epstein comments:
The open, nonideological vocabulary of SDS allowed for creative exploration of new 
ideas but also imposed an innocence on the theoretical language of the left, reflecting 
the movement’s reluctance to commit itself to particular goals or to find a particular 
standpoint from which a revolutionary strategy could be put forward.
However, when SDS became something like a mass movement and 
simultaneously turned toward revolution in the later 1960s, ‘innocence 
meant lack of sophistication and a vulnerability to the revolutionary 
 posturing of... sects’. In the absence of any theoretical alternative, the 
movement was swept up by models of revolution predominantly based 
on Maoist theorizing and Third World experience (Epstein, 1991: 41-3). 
The tensions led to a conference in 1969, which split SDS into a system 
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of competing sects.35 Authoritarianism and moralism were rampant in the 
movement and not confined to the sects. Feminism, as Epstein comments, 
might have offered the strongest basis for a critique of these tendencies, 
except that it was also infected by them.
Throughout the movement, politics and personal morality could easily become coer-
cive. Admiration for Third World revolutions and a growing understanding of the 
oppressive role of the United States produced widespread guilt feelings, which tended 
to undermine good judgement. To the degree that political activity was an attempt 
to prove one’s dedication (or test that of others), clear-minded evaluation of the 
movement’s aims and strategies became difficult. Emulation of Third World models 
created havoc by encouraging a militaristic style and undermining the values to which 
the early New Left had dedicated itself, damaging the movement’s relations with 
allies and potential allies outside the student and youth milieu. (Epstein, 1991: 45)
A different outcome would have required an American left that saw itself 
more as part of a long-term tradition, which realised that revolution was not 
due immediately, and could therefore think creatively about what a commit-
ment to the revolutionizing of American society might entail. Epstein is care-
ful to dissociate her judgments on the period from those who think that the 
turn to revolution was itself a mistake, for that ‘misses what was legitimate 
about the impulse that shaped those politics’ (Epstein, 1991: 47). As it was, 
the best that could be hoped was, as Sam Friedman suggested, that the ‘sys-
tem of sects’ would winnow itself down by competition, in a process that 
might, with luck, produce a winner with a clearer vision of a way forward 
for the US left (Friedman, 1984-5).36 The winnowing certainly happened, 
but no clear victor emerged. By the later 1970s the American left was much 
reduced, and ‘permeationism’ was again attracting many former radicals. 
Not only did it matter what general views students developed, but so too 
did the kinds of political organizations they formed or joined. For these 
shaped their activities, their ideas, their views about organizational ques-
tions, their exclusiveness or otherwise. The worst extremes were repre-
sented by those who turned away from any kind of effort at persuasion and 
involvement of others, towards the closed world of terrorist violence. While 
some on the left professed to admire them, groups like the Red Brigades in 
Italy, The Red Army Faction in Germany or Weatherman in the USA 
35 There is a biased, but revealing, report by an undercover agent who attended SDS’s final Chicago 
convention in 1969, at http://martinrealm.org/documents/radical/sixties1.html.
36 See also the remarks on the elimination of arbitrary groups by competition in Gramsci, 1971: 341.
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 represented an extremely elitist politics, which wrote off the majority, 
 working class or otherwise, as a source of any significant social initiative. 
The Maoist groups, whose largest representative organizations were in Italy 
and North America, modelled themselves on a form of revised Stalinist 
organization, with very top-down leadership styles. By the second half of 
the 1970s they were imploding, as heady illusions in the ‘cultural revolu-
tion’ in China faded with the rise of Deng Xiaoping and then the Vietnamese 
invasion of Cambodia and China’s war with Vietnam. These organizations 
had been least able to relate sympathetically to the growth of second-wave 
feminism, and therefore also to a working class whose gender composition 
was changing quite rapidly. Numbers of them, with previously quite large 
memberships, formally wound up in the later 1970s.37 
Whatever their several failings, the combined forces of the revolutionary left 
in the advanced capitalist countries were insufficient to win hegemony within 
larger movements against the combined forces, not simply of states, but cru-
cially of the inherited reformist parties and unions. Any judgment about them 
has to be framed by that elementary fact: in the conditions of the time, they 
could not have won. Rather, they have to be assessed in terms of their capac-
ity to lay significant foundations for revolutionary organizations, which could 
survive disappointments and remain committed to seeking the total transfor-
mation of capitalism. Outside a few organizations deriving from Trotskyist 
traditions, most of the revolutionary groups that were born from or expanded 
through the student movements failed. With unrealistic perspectives and 
unsuitable organizational forms, their capacity to relate to the real complexity 
of the movements of the sixties and seventies was weak. Most left behind 
them little but a mood of disenchantment with the revolutionary project itself.
The	End	of	the	Wave
The late sixties and early seventies saw the term ‘revolution’ come back into 
fairly widespread use, and not only to describe events in Third World 
 countries. The movements of the time initiated a boom in Marxist and 
 radical publishing, not only from left organizations but also from bourgeois 
publishers who spotted a new market. After two decades of apparent 
 postwar conformity in both West and East, a literature appeared that was 
more aware and more critical of the ‘contradictions’ in social development. 
Such literature was naturally more appealing, especially when it seemed 
possible that such contradictions might be resolved through adequate move-
ment action, ideology and organization.
37 For the European experience, see Harman, 1979.
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From the mid-1970s, however, confidence in the possibility of large-scale 
transformation from below began to wane. By the late 1970s, there was a 
widespread mood of rejection of left analyses and prescriptions. A more 
conservative trend in thought became predominant, marked by the increas-
ing influence of ‘post-structuralist’ and ‘post-modernist’ ideas. These 
involved turning away from global solutions, indeed even from speaking of 
global problems – even though these problems, in real terms, were multi-
plying as the long postwar economic boom shuddered to a halt. Left-wing 
hopes in China ended with Mao’s death, the overthrow of the Gang of Four 
and Deng Xiaoping’s access to power. In France, celebrated in the pages of 
New Left Review during the late sixties and early seventies as the world cen-
tre of radical thought, the collapse of the Union of the Left went along with 
the rise of the nouveaux philosophes, former Maoist intellectuals who now 
denounced Marxism as a theory leading to the Gulag. By 1983, Perry 
Anderson could call Paris ‘the capital of European intellectual reaction’.
If 1968 had been a ‘highpoint’ of the protest wave, the years 1974-6 
marked its end. These years were marked by the stabilization of bour-
geois rule everywhere, as ruling classes repaired their own structures and 
re-asserted their hegemony. In the US, the Ford and Carter Presidencies 
overcame the traumas of Vietnam and Watergate, kept their armed forces 
clear of any involvement in land wars, cut the FBI and CIA down to size, 
and offered amnesties to thousands of draft-dodgers and deserters, allowing 
dissidents to reintegrate into the mainstream. In Britain, Edward Heath’s 
embattled conservative government was replaced by a Labour government 
that enjoyed whole-hearted cooperation from trade-union leaders, both 
right and ‘left’. In southern Europe, Greece, Portugal and Spain all made 
‘democratic transitions’ – in the Portuguese case only after a dramatic 
 eighteen months of popular revolutionary movements – to parliamentary 
democracies, in which formerly persecuted political parties were permitted 
to play important roles. Italy’s largest opposition party, the Communist 
Party, was finally allowed a say in government for the first time in thirty 
years. The ‘managed transition’ in Spain launched a series of comparable 
processes that affected much wider areas of the world, notably in Latin 
America, where military regimes negotiated ‘soft democratizations’ (Barker, 
1998; Potter et al., 1997).
The mid-1970s restructuring of capital and its relationship with labour 
occurred against the background of the world’s first significant postwar 
economic crisis, which combined international stagnation and rising infla-
tion levels. At the very centre of world capitalism, New York City’s bankers 
foreclosed on their loans, compelling an enormous down-sizing of the city’s 
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welfare and wages bill, and taking over the administration of the city’s 
budget. The restructuring in Europe was achieved, not by direct repres-
sion, but by negotiated agreements with the leaders of social-democratic 
and communist unions and parties. The typical form of the agreement was 
a formal ‘pact’ between governments and the official leaders of labour move-
ments, whether in Britain’s ‘Social Contract’, Spain’s ‘Pact of Moncloa’ or 
the ‘Historic Compromise’ effected by the Italian Communist Party under 
Enrico Berlinguer. The terms of the agreements were similar: in return for 
admission into the corridors of power, the official institutions of labour 
agreed to restrict and contain workers’ demands, to demobilize popular 
resistance. The costs of the economic crisis were shifted onto labour’s shoul-
ders, all in the name of ‘economic necessity’, ‘fighting inflation’ and ‘realism’. 
Many formerly militant trade unionists were disquieted and disoriented, 
but – with rising unemployment levels – the previous readiness to engage 
in ‘rank and file’, ‘unofficial’ and ‘wildcat’ strike action declined. The 
 revolutionary left was unable to mobilize significant workplace resistance. 
In Britain, some workers drew an obvious conclusion from the disappoint-
ments of the Labour government: in 1979, seeing the Labour party, once 
the focus of their hopes, offering no more than the Tories, they voted Tory. 
Mrs Thatcher won the election.
In Italy, Lumley dates the final end of the protest wave in 1978, a year 
marked by the collapse and fragmentation of social movements and collec-
tive action, The New Left disintegrated, the unions were integrated into 
political system, the PCI formally accepted the ‘historic compromise’ and 
forfeited its oppositional role. This was the period of the temporary ascend-
ancy of the Red Brigades, provoking further ideological crisis on the left. 
The women’s movement, too, was affected. 1978-80 became known as ‘the 
years of silence’ (Lumley, 1990: 329).
These transformations did not, however, mean the end of all student 
movements. What they did was to ‘normalise’ them. From the beginning 
of the 1970s, in Britain, new kinds of issues mobilized student activists, now 
well used to the idea of collective action. Already by the early 1970s, the 
growing world economic crisis was inducing cutbacks in spending on higher 
education. As the British White Paper of 1972 put it, ‘scope must be found 
for economies of scale’ (Callinicos and Turner, 1975: 11). Rising inflation 
reduced the real value of student grants. Concerns with material questions 
became more prominent. So did student involvement with the national stu-
dents union, which the sixties movements had largely ignored as irrelevant 
(Widgery, 1969). Where previously the NUS executive had been controlled 
by an alliance of Tories and right-wing Labour students, now a moderate 
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left alliance (Communist Party and left Labour) took control. The Tory edu-
cation minister in 1970-74 was Mrs Thatcher, who sought to prevent 
 campus-based student unions from donating funds to strikers or to an anti-
government campaign defending free milk for school-children. A national 
campaign in defence of student union autonomy rallied large numbers of 
‘non-political’ students. So too did the first national campaign over student 
grants, involving rent strikes and large demonstrations. These campaigns 
mobilized, not so much the older universities which had often been the 
storm centres of the sixties movements, but students from smaller colleges 
with a higher working-class presence. The Labour Government after 1974 
brought huge cutbacks in capital spending on education, threatening 
 everyday conditions in the colleges. The pressure of the cutbacks was felt 
hardest not in the older universities, but in the Polytechnics, the teacher 
training and further education colleges. The NUS ‘left’ leadership was now 
ideologically closer to the rest of the trade union leadership, and did no 
more than their older colleagues to lead a serious fight. 
Across the face of advanced capitalism, higher education continued to 
expand the numbers of students. In practice, the previously relatively priv-
ileged situation of students declined further. So did their job prospects. In 
West Germany, the share of university graduates finding public-sector jobs 
tumbled from 60% in the early 1970s to 25% by the end of the decade, and 
unemployment rates among graduates began to converge with those among 
the workforce generally (Zirakzadeh, 2006).
The steady strengthening of ‘neo-liberalism’ increasingly affected the 
 situation in universities and colleges. Like the rest of social relations, the 
principles of ‘marketization’ were driven through higher education. Large 
parts of the sector were converted into ‘training’ institutions, increasingly 
subordinated to the immediate needs of capitalist business. Systems of state 
support for student grants were pared back or abolished, forcing increas-
ing numbers of students to seek paid employment during their courses, and 
loading them up with debts (Callinicos, 2006).
Retrospect	and	Prospect
For a period in the 1960s, student movements and the social explosions 
they provoked on campuses across the world contributed more than any 
other social group to a changing social climate. Even if they were often brief 
and spasmodic, they altered the balance of ideas and values in advanced 
capitalist society. They also provided key cadres for other movements of 
the period. SNCC, for example, brought new life and impetus to the US 
civil rights movement at a moment when it seemed to be in the doldrums, 
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and its ideas and activists inspired both the black power movement and, 
indirectly, the Black Panthers Party.
As well as directly political organizations, the student movement con-
tributed strongly to the development of a ‘cultural underground’, which 
both provided some of the style of student politics and also acted as a 
 substitute for politics for many. The student movement went along with a 
whole questioning of existing life styles and cultural assumptions, which 
sometimes shocked conservative forces in society (in ‘communist’ states at 
least as much as in the ‘liberal’ west) even more than overt student politi-
cal action. Student movements massively amplified across the globe Bob 
Dylan’s famous advice to older generations: ‘Your sons and your daughters 
are beyond your command, The old order’s rapidly changing [...]’.38 The 
‘cultural underground’ reshaped attitudes to sexuality, not least amongst 
women. It drew on resources from outside student milieux, from working-
class and ghetto life, and fed into other movements of the time: into the 
wildcat strike movements in American factories around 1970, and the oppo-
sitional culture of US soldiers and marines in the later years of the war in 
Vietnam. It was, too, within student movements that the first serious stirrings 
of second-wave feminism were heard. Women members of SNCC wrote 
the first ‘position paper’ on feminism, and some of the earliest battles on 
the question were fought inside the very sexist atmosphere of the Students 
for a Democratic Society (Freeman, 1975).
Student movements radicalized numbers of their participants. The mech-
anisms involved have been well identified. Actual participation in collec-
tive action can be, as theorists have noted, a major source of changing social 
identities (Klandermans, 1992; Reicher, 1991; Reicher, 1996). A rising and 
expanding protest wave provides a dialogical setting in which information 
about self and society changes, potentially altering the balance between 
fatalism and acceptance on one side and a belief, on the other, that the social 
order can be both criticized and altered. Confidence in the possibilities of 
collective action can grow, along with openings of the imagination to new 
possibilities. What previously seemed ‘fixed and unalterable’ can come 
to seem motile and open to practical questioning. The sense of relative 
powerlessness, which infects the politics of everyday life, can be transmuted, 
quite quickly, into a more active and cheerful apprehension of new hori-
zons of hope. The ‘natural’ and ‘given’ quality of the present order only 
begins to dissolve when it is challenged in practice, and when the challenge 
embodies, at least in half-recognizable embryo form, the shape of a different 
38 ‘The times they are a-changing’, recorded 24 October 1963.
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possible order. What Goodwyn wrote about participants in the birth of the 
Polish ‘Solidarity’ movement in 1980 also applies to the students who made 
the campus protests of the sixties and early seventies:
When individuals who have suddenly acquired an enhanced sense of self gaze upon 
others who have been part of the joint effort and who have acquired the same 
enhanced sense, a new kind of connection occurs. The feeling is distinctly one of 
personal achievement, but it also is organically a product of collective action.
The process, he notes, possesses ‘an emotional significance that can yield 
surprising political breakthroughs’. Collective action and interaction can 
promote new forms of knowledge about how things can be achieved which 
were, previously, beyond the bounds of the possible. There is ‘a merger 
of knowledge with emotion, a conjunction forced by lived experience’. 
(Goodwyn, 1991: 16, 192)
Such changes could occur more rapidly among students than other 
groups, because of their social situation. University is one of the few places 
that brings large groups of young people together on a semi-permanent 
basis. Few factories or offices are composed solely of young workers. 
Students’ material responsibilities are less, and they are also less constrained 
in their forms of action than workers. If workers strike, they have to vote 
first, in order to be sure that they will carry the majority, for strike-breakers 
are a real practical problem. But it’s easier for students: a significant minority 
can occupy some university buildings, and have a high impact, without 
 necessarily worrying too much about the rest of the student body. Students 
possess the advantages in collective action of rapid potential organization, 
imagination and fluidity. Their structural disadvantages are that they lack 
traditions of permanent organization, and they can often find their struggles 
isolated from the rest of society. Their capacity to do lasting damage to 
 capital and the state is limited, for they lack control of resources whose 
withholding can seriously hurt the powerful. Their struggles could some-
times appear like fireworks displays, momentarily dazzling but then as 
quickly disappearing.
When they were isolated, student revolts often left little lasting mark. 
They won some small concessions by way of minority ‘representation’ on 
university decision-making bodies, though they were always excluded from 
important subcommittees on matters like finance and staffing. They did 
succeed in breaking previous assumptions about university control – ‘in 
loco parentis’ – over aspects of their lives such as their housing patterns and 
sexual activity.
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It seems clear that student struggles alone did not detonate big social 
challenges to the status quo. It was when they combined with other social forces, 
sometimes only indirectly, that the largest challenges to the social order 
appeared. The general strike in France in May 1968 was perhaps the student 
movement’s greatest single achievement, but they could only set it in motion 
without shaping its course. If we think of the student movements as ‘initi-
ators’ (McAdam, 1995), there remains a problem for them, which is that of 
‘resources’. The fate of student movements is inherently tied to that of wider 
movements in society, whose tempos and patterns of activity may be much 
slower and different, but which can be decisive in a way that most student 
movements can’t. 
Student struggles of the 1960s and early 1970s sometimes paved the way 
for other movements, they provided imaginative energy, they provoked and 
excited. They produced some of the key cadres of a revived Left which was 
then tested in other struggles, beyond the limits of the campus. Umberto 
Eco’s words about Italy apply far more generally:
Even though all visible traces of 1968 are gone, it profoundly changed the way all of 
us, at least in Europe, behave and relate to one another. Relations between bosses 
and workers, students and teachers, even children and parents, have opened up. 
They’ll never be the same again. (cited Lumley, 1990: 2)
Since that time, much has changed. True, the influx of working-class 
 students into higher education continued, but their experience became 
more and more like that of the ‘training’ institutions. The expansion of post-
-secondary education has continued, driven as in the sixties by the deepen-
ing of the so-called ‘knowledge economy’. University research is tied, ever 
more closely, to the demands of business. The relatively privileged status of 
both academic staff and students has continued to decline, as their num-
bers have risen. More and more the ‘precarity’ that has been identified as 
a feature of the modern worker’s condition has affected teachers and 
 students alike. Within universities, the apparent gains of the sixties, in the 
formalization of partial ‘democracy’ on the campus, has receded as a new 
cadre of university administrators has developed and instituted increas-
ingly ‘top-down’ forms of internal government – and demanded increasingly 
superior pay rewards for themselves (Callinicos, 2006).
What does this mean for student movements today? If France, home of 
the ‘May events’, is any guide, the changed conditions may also offer huge 
new possibilities. In April and May 2006 a spectacular movement of both 
university and high-school students, supported by the trade unions, 
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 succeeded in forcing the government to withdraw a new draft law. That law 
would have allowed employers to sack workers under the age of 26 during 
the first two years of their employment contracts. This was a serious defeat 
for the government’s ‘neo-liberal’ plans to impose greater ‘precarity’ on the 
workforce. On this occasion, unlike 1968, relations between students and 
workers were much closer. As one commentator pointed out, these new 
possibilities were a response to the blurring of the old separation between 
educational institutions and workplaces in the latest phase of capitalist 
development. As education has been subjected increasingly to ‘capitalist- 
-commodity logic’, so whole sectors of business have come to depend on 
full- and part-time students to staff their operations in fast food, call cen-
tres, supermarket chains and the like. The result, in France, was that ‘[t]his 
time the school and university youth has acted as part of the world of 
labour. [...] This “great transformation” has, of course (in comparison with 
1968) not only made easier the link with workers but, above all, has given 
this an “organic” character, the character of the building of a common 
 struggle, and not of an alliance or solidarity between separate movements’ 
(Kouvelakis, 2006).
The future remains open, and potentially very interesting indeed.
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